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SUMMARY 
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck the Canterbury region on the South Island 
of New Zealand. The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield area about 40 km west of 
the city of Christchurch. Extensive damage was inflicted to lifelines and residential houses due to 
widespread liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major streams, rivers and wetlands 
throughout Christchurch and Kaiapoi. Unreinforced masonry buildings also suffered extensive damage 
throughout the region. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and residential houses, fortunately, no 
deaths occurred and only two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an engineering viewpoint, 
one may argue that the most significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were geotechnical in 
nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage.  
Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence 
and perishable data from this event. The surveys were performed on foot, by car and from a helicopter 
over a period of six days. A broad-brush field reconnaissance was conducted in the first two days, 
followed by pin-point investigations at specific locations including detailed site inspections and field 
testing using: Dynamic Cone Penetration Test (DCPT), Swedish Weight Sounding (SWS), and Spectral 
Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW). 
This paper summarizes the observations and preliminary findings from this early reconnaissance work. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On 4 September 2010, a magnitude Mw 7.1 earthquake struck 
the Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand. 
The epicentre of the earthquake was located in the Darfield 
area about 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. Extensive 
damage occurred to unreinforced masonry buildings 
throughout the region during the mainshock and subsequent 
large aftershocks. Particularly extensive damage was inflicted 
to lifelines and residential houses due to widespread 
liquefaction and lateral spreading in areas close to major 
streams, rivers and wetlands throughout Christchurch and 
Kaiapoi. Despite the severe damage to infrastructure and 
residential houses, fortunately, no deaths occurred and only 
two injuries were reported in this earthquake. From an 
engineering viewpoint, one may argue that the most 
significant aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were 
geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading 
being the principal culprits for the inflicted damage. 
Following the earthquake, a geotechnical reconnaissance was 
conducted over a period of six days (10–15 September 2010) 
by a team of geotechnical/earthquake engineers and geologists 
from New Zealand and USA (GEER team: Geo-engineering 
Extreme Event Reconnaissance). The team included the 
following members: 
Assoc. Prof. Misko Cubrinovski – NZ Lead (University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Assoc. Prof. Russell A. Green – US Lead (Virginia Tech, 
Blacksburg, VA, USA) 
Mr. Tom Algie – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New 
Zealand) 
Mr. John Allen – (TRI/Environmental, Inc., Austin, TX, 
USA) 
Prof. Scott Ashford – (Oregon State University, Corvallis, 
OR, USA) 
Mr. Jawad Arefi – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 
New Zealand) 
Dr. Elisabeth Bowman – (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Dr. Brendon Bradley – (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Assist. Prof. Brady Cox – (University of Arkansas, 
Fayetteville, AR, USA) 
Mr. William Godwin – (Fugro William Lettis and 
Associates, Inc., Walnut Creek, CA, USA) 
Prof. Tara Hutchinson – (University of California, San 
Diego, CA, USA) 
Prof. Edward Kavazanjian – (Arizona State University, 
Tempe, AZ, USA) 
Dr. Tam Larkin – (University of Auckland, Auckland, New 
Zealand) 
Dr. Rolando Orense – (University of Auckland, Auckland, 
New Zealand) 
Prof. Michael Pender – (University of Auckland, Auckland, 
New Zealand) 
Dr. Mark Quigley – (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 
New Zealand) 
Ms. Kelly Robinson – (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Mr. Merrick Taylor – (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Dr. Thomas Wilson – (University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, New Zealand) 
Dr. Liam Wotherspoon – (University of Auckland, 
Auckland, New Zealand) 
 
The following JGS (Japanese Geotechnical Society) members 
from Japan also participated in the reconnaissance team from 
13 to 15 September 2010: 
Prof. Mitsu Okamura – JGS Lead (Ehime University, 
Matsuyama, Japan) 
Assoc. Prof. Takashi Kiyota – (Institute of Industrial 
Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan) 
Assoc. Prof. Hirofumi Toyota – (Nagaoka University of 
Technology, Nagaoka, Japan) 
The NZ, GEER and JGS members worked as one team and 
shared resources, information and logistics in order to conduct 
a thorough and efficient reconnaissance covering a large area 
over a very limited time period. This paper summarises the 
key evidence and findings from the reconnaissance. Any 
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the associated organisations 
and funding agencies. 
 
2. GEOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
2.1 Summary 
At 4:35 am on September 4th NZ Standard Time (16:35 Sept 
3rd UTC) the rupture of a previously unrecognized strike-slip 
fault beneath the Canterbury Plains of New Zealand‟s South 
Island produced a Mw 7.1 earthquake. Although this 
earthquake caused widespread damage to the Canterbury 
region, it also allowed documenting the dynamics and effects 
of a major strike-slip fault rupture in the fortuitous absence of 
death or major injuries. The low relief and well maintained 
agricultural landscape of the Canterbury Plains has provided 
an ideal environment to characterise even the most subtle of 
earthquake-related ground deformation at high resolution. This 
chapter summarizes the basic geological context and ground 
rupture characteristics of the earthquake. 
2.2 Geological context for the 
Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake 
The tectonic plate boundary between the Australian (A) and 
Pacific (P) Plates passes through the South Island of New 
Zealand, where subduction of the Hikurangi Plateau to the 
north transitions into a continent-continent collision zone 
associated with the collision of the Chatham Rise with 
continental crust of the Australian Plate (Figure 2.1). The A 
and P plates converge obliquely at 48–39 mm/yr in New 
Zealand. The resultant collision zone between these plates is 
not a line on a map; rather it is a distributed zone of active 
faults each with their own capability of generating large 
earthquakes throughout/around New Zealand. The 
Marlborough Fault Zone consists of a series of large, 
„transpressional‟ faults that record primarily right-lateral 
displacement with a component of shortening, resulting in 
mountain uplift. These faults ultimately link to the Alpine 
Fault, which accommodates ~70-75% of the total relative plate 
boundary motion between the A-P Plates with a values of 27 ± 
5 mm/ yr of strike-slip and 5–10 mm/yr of dip-slip (Norris & 
Cooper 2001). The remaining ~30% of A-P plate motion is 
accommodated by slip on a series of faults throughout the 
Southern Alps and Canterbury Plains. The Greendale Fault, 
which was the source of the 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) 
earthquake, is one of these structures, although it was not 
recognized prior to this earthquake. Much of the motion is 
likely taken up on the other big faults, such as the Porter‟s 
Pass Fault, which has a slip rate of 3-7 mm/yr  (3–5 mm/yr; 
e.g. Cowan et al. 1996; Howard et al. 2005; 7 mm/yr; Wallace 
et al., 2007). Modelling of GPS-derived velocity fields 
suggests a strain rate of ~2 mm/yr of WNW oriented 
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permanent contraction for the region east of the Porter‟s Pass 
Fault to offshore of Christchurch that hosts the Greendale 
Fault (“Canterbury Block”; Wallace et al., 2007). There are 
several structures in this region, both expressed at the surface 
and „hidden‟ beneath the surface, that pose an earthquake 
hazard to Christchurch (e.g., Hororata Fault, Hororata 
anticline, Springbank Fault, Bobby‟s Creek Fault, Greendale 
Fault). E-W trending faults are present throughout Canterbury 
and offshore on the Chatham Rise, and some of these are now 
'active' faults (i.e. faults that have had large earthquakes in the 
last ~10,000 yrs and/or have the potential to generate 
earthquakes in the modern setting). In a general sense, E-W 
trending faults like the Greendale fault tend to be strike-slip 
dominated faults  (e.g., Porter‟s Pass Fault; Bobby‟s Creek 
Fault, Ashley Fault) while NE-SW to N-S trending faults tend 
to be reverse-slip dominated faults with smaller components 
of strike-slip (e.g., Springfield Fault, Springbank Fault, 
Hororata Fault). As is clear from this recent earthquake, it is 
important to obtain more information on the locations of all 
active faults beneath the Canterbury Plains (via geophysical 
and mapping investigations) and earthquake histories of all 
faults (via mapping and paleoseismic analysis) in order to 
better understand the risk that these structures pose to the 
Canterbury region (Pettinga et al., 2001). 
2.3 The September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) 
Earthquake  
The epicentre of the Darfield Earthquake was located 
approximately 10 km southeast of the town of Darfield (Figure 
2.2) with a focal depth of ~10 km. Preliminary USGS and 
global centroid moment tensor solutions indicated the 
mainshock was associated with almost pure dextral (right-
lateral) strike-slip slip on a subvertical nearly E-W striking 
fault plane. The event produced a ≥ 28 km long, dextral strike-
slip surface rupture trace, aligned approximately west-east 
(Figure 2.2). Using data from New Zealand national and 
strong-motion seismic networks, GNS seismologists have 
proposed that the rupture process involved a component of 
reverse faulting at depth. In the month following the 
mainshock, the region has incurred thousands of aftershocks 
of ML > 2 including eleven aftershocks of ML ≥ 5.0. A ML 5.2 
aftershock on September 8th (NZST) located ~7 km southeast 
of the Christchurch city centre at a depth of ~6 km caused 
further damage to city infrastructure. The frequency of ML > 2 
aftershocks has decreased by an order of magnitude since the 
days immediately following the mainshock although the 
possibility of M ≥ 5 earthquakes still remains, as the region 
adjusts to the crustal deformation associated with the 
mainshock.  
Aftershock distributions proximal to the E-W trending part of 
the Greendale fault are dominated by ~E-W trending dextral 
strike-slip mechanisms, as expected from kinematic analysis 
of the patterns of ground rupture. A NE-trending cloud of 
aftershocks west of the Greendale fault, between Hororata and 
the Rakaia River is dominated by ~NE trending thrust fault 
mechanisms.  A NE-trending cloud of aftershocks north of the 
Greendale fault, between Darfield and the Waimakariri River 
is a mixture of ~NE trending thrust fault and strike-slip fault 
mechanisms. A NNW-trending swarm of seismicity from ~5 
km north of Rolleston south to Lincoln consists of a mixture 
of NW-trending normal fault mechanisms and (probably) E-W 
trending dextral strike slip mechanisms. 
The NE and NW trending belts of seismicity are consistent 
with field observations of subtle deformation in these 
localities although these aspects require further research. 
 
Figure 2.1: A-P plate boundary through New Zealand 
and convergence rates of P relative to A 
Plate. (Image courtesy of Jarg Pettinga). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Aerial image of the Christchurch area with 
the surface fault rupture and the epicentre of 
the Darfield earthquake are denoted. The 
image is ~117 km across. 
 
2.4 Characteristics of the surface fault rupture 
The zone of identified surface rupture extends from ~4 km 
WNW of the hamlet of Greendale for about 28 km to an 
eastern tip ~2 km NW of the town of Rolleston (Figure 2.2). 
Offsets and fracture patterns reveal up to 4.6 meters of 
displacement, with an average displacement of ~2.3 m across 
the entire rupture. Figure 2.3 shows comparisons of the 
average and maximum fault displacements with global fault 
data compiled by Wells and Coppersmith (1994). As may be 
observed from these comparisons, the average and maximum 
displacements are slightly larger, but very close to, the best fit 
line of the global fault data. The displacement on the 
Greendale fault during the Darfield earthquake was dominated 
by dextral (right lateral) movement (Figure 2.4). 
Greendale fault 
epicentre 
 
 
246 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Comparisons of average (top) and maximum (bottom) surface rupture displacements for the Darfield 
earthquake with global fault data compiled by Wells and Coppersmith (1994). (Global fault data courtesy of Don Wells). 
  
Figure 2.3: Photographs of surface fault rupture on the Greendale fault. 
(Left photo: http://daveslandslideblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/images-of-darfield-canterbury.html). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Comparison of surface rupture length (SRL) for the Darfield earthquake with global fault data compiled by 
Wells and Coppersmith (1994). (Global fault data courtesy of Don Wells). 
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Vertical offsets of up to ~1 m occur at constraining or 
releasing bends. Oblique east-side down slip on the NW-
striking western portion of the fault resulted in partial 
diversion of the Hororata River. The gross morphology of the 
fault is that of a series of E-W striking, NE-stepping surface 
traces that in detail consist of ESE-trending Riedel fractures 
with right-lateral displacements, SE-trending extensional 
fractures, SSE- to S-trending Riedel' fractures with left-lateral 
displacements, and NE-striking thrusts and folds. Offsets as 
small as 10-50 mm were able to be mapped due to the 
numerous straight features (e.g., roads, fences) crossing the 
fault. As a consequence, the Greendale fault surface rupture 
length (SRL) has been measured to a high level of confidence. 
However, when the SRL is plotted against Moment Magnitude 
(Mw), and compared to global fault data (Figure 2.5), the 
Greendale SRL seems remarkably short for an earthquake of 
Mw 7.1. This is likely because much of the fault rupture 
occurred beneath the surface without any clear surface 
topographic expression. An ENE trending, ≥ 6 km long line of 
broken fences and roads ~2 km south of Prebbleton indicates 
that the rupture process may have been complex and involved 
additional faults; this hypothesis is currently being tested with 
further geological mapping and shallow crustal geophysics. 
The eastern end of the fault north of Rolleston is undergoing 
creep at the surface, suggesting that the subsurface extent of 
the Greendale Fault rupture may extend further to the east then 
the mapped surface rupture. There is no seismological 
evidence to support the continuation of the fault into 
Christchurch City and post-earthquake creep along faults is an 
expected and well documented phenomenon. Ongoing 
research and mapping of deformation throughout the region 
will provide additional constraints on the spatial pattern of 
surface rupture. 
2.5 History of the Greendale fault  
Given the E-W strike of the Greendale Fault, it is very likely 
that this fault first formed during crustal extension more than 
50 to 60 million years ago, when the shape of New Zealand 
(aka Zealandia) was much different from today. The 
Greendale Fault ruptured primarily across alluvial plains of 
the „Burnham‟ surface, abandoned by rivers at the end of the 
Last Glaciation (Forsyth et al. 2008). No evidence of previous 
faulting had been recognized, either prior to the earthquake or 
in retrospective examination of pre-earthquake aerial 
photographs. However, thorough cultivation of the Canterbury 
Plains following the arrival of Europeans in the mid 1800s, 
some detail of the original river channel form has been 
subdued. Vertical offset along much of the new fault trace was 
minimal, given the strike-slip dominated movement, it is 
probable that previous earthquakes had small vertical-to-
lateral displacements that would have evolved with time into 
isolated small hills that would not be easily recognizable as 
fault scarps. It is also possible that previous earthquakes did 
not produce surface rupture, as was the case for the 2010 Mw 
7.0 Haiti earthquake, which shows no evidence for faulting at 
the surface. For these reasons, it is important to be cautious 
when drawing conclusions on the long term earthquake history 
of the Greendale Fault based on aerial photographs. Future 
research into „paleo-liquefaction‟ features and fault trenching 
will hopefully yield datasets relevant to understanding the 
long-term history of this fault. Other, possibly analogous 
faults (e.g., Bobby‟s Creek Fault, Ashley Fault) have 
Holocene earthquake recurrence intervals ranging from 1,000-
4,000 yrs. 
2.6 Geomorphology of Soil Deposits 
in the Christchurch Area  
The Canterbury Plains, about 160 km long and of varying 
width, are New Zealand‟s largest areas of flat land. The plains 
have been formed by the overlapping fans of glacier-fed rivers 
originating from the Southern Alps. The plains are often 
described as fertile, but the soils are variable. Most are derived 
from the greywacke of the mountains or from loess (fine 
sediment blown from riverbeds). In addition, clay and 
volcanic rock are present near Christchurch from the Port Hills 
slopes of the Banks Peninsula.  
The city of Christchurch is located at the coast of the 
Canterbury Plains adjacent to an extinct volcanic complex 
forming Banks Peninsula. Most of the city was developed on 
swamp, beach dune sand, estuaries and lagoons, which have 
now been drained (Brown et al., 1995). The two main rivers, 
Avon and Heathcote, which originate from springs in western 
Christchurch, meander through the city and act as main 
drainage system. The Waimakariri River with its catchment in 
the Southern Alps, regularly flooded Christchurch prior to 
stopbank construction and river realignment, which began 
shortly after the city was established in 1850.  
Of particular relevance to the liquefaction and lateral 
spreading that occurred during the Darfield earthquake are the 
locations of the abandoned/old river channels of the 
Waimakariri River. The area surrounding Kaiapoi as it exists 
today is shown in Figure 2.6. The main branch of the 
Waimakariri River flows from the west to the east, curving 
northwards as it passes beneath the town of Kaiapoi. A 
network of stop banks has been constructed to constrain the 
flow of the river. The Kaiapoi River runs through the centre of 
Kaiapoi and is a tributary to the Waimakariri River. However, 
as discussed below, the Kaiapoi River used to be a branch of 
the Waimakariri River. 
The area shown in Figure 2.6 is also shown in Figure 2.7, as it 
existed in 1935. The differences in the river channels from 
1935 and the present have been highlighted. The red dashed 
line represents the current position of the Waimakariri River, 
showing that there has been little movement between 1935 and 
today. However, two differences in the locations of the river 
channels are highlighted in red and green in Figure 2.7. The 
red zone highlights an old river bed that is south of the 
Waimakariri River and that runs in a north-easterly direction, 
connecting to the Waimakariri River. A man-made channel 
diverts the flow of the Waimakariri River from the old bed. 
The green shaded region highlights the course of the old north 
branch of the Waimakariri River that used to flow around the 
western side of Kaiapoi, joining up with the present day 
Kaiapoi River in the centre of town. Finally, at the mouth of 
the Waimakariri River, the differences in sand bar 
characteristics in 1935 and today are highlighted in blue. 
Today the Waimakariri River empties into the ocean north of 
where it did in 1935, with sand bars extending from both the 
north and the south in 1935. 
 
Figure 2.6: Kaiapoi and vicinity, present day (Google Inc. 
2010). 
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Figure 2.7: Kaiapoi and vicinity, 1935. (Image from Christchurch City Libraries; Shell NZ, 1935). 
 
Figure 2.8: Kaiapoi and vicinity, 1865. (Ward & Reeves, 1865). 
 
Figure 2.9:  Present day Kaiapoi with position of 1865 river channel highlighted in red. (Google Inc. 2010). 
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The 1865 position of the south branch of the Waimakariri 
River is superimposed onto the present day map of the region 
in Figure 2.9. The old channel covers a large area on the 
eastern side of South Kaiapoi, coming from the south along 
the present-day railway line. South of the present-day 
Waimakariri River, the old channel covers a large part of the 
Coutts Island area on both sides of State Highway 1, extending 
west across farms and golf courses on the landside of the 
present day stopbanks. The implications of the location of the 
old river channel on the observed liquefaction and lateral 
spreading that occurred during Darfield Earthquake are 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
3. SEISMOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
3.1 Regional seismicity and historical earthquakes 
New Zealand straddles the boundary of the Australian and 
Pacific plates, where relative plate motion is obliquely 
convergent across the plate boundary at about 50 mm/yr in the 
north of the country, 40 mm/yr in the centre, and 30 mm/yr in 
the south (DeMets et al. 1994).  The complex faulting 
associated with the changing orientation of the subduction 
zones in the northeast and southwest, causes predominantly 
dextral faulting through the axial tectonic  belt in the centre of 
the country.   
As a result of this complex faulting, New Zealand is a region 
of distributed seismicity, in that the relative movement of the 
Australian and Pacific plates are not accommodated by one or 
two faults in a narrow zone, but by many faults across a much 
wider zone (the axial tectonic belt).  It is therefore not 
surprising to observe that both large historical earthquakes 
(Figure 3.1a), and recent seismicity (Figure 3.1b) can occur in 
almost any region in New Zealand. 
3.2 Finite fault models 
Finite fault models for the Darfield earthquake have been 
developed by several different organizations.  Two publicly 
available inversions from USGS and ERI are shown in Figure 
3.2 and Figure 3.3. Given that finite fault inversions are ill-
conditioned, as expected, there are some differences between 
the models. However, both models illustrate that the 
nucleation point was approximately at the centre of the 
ruptured fault plane.  The resulting bi-lateral rupture therefore 
would have resulted in notably shorter duration of intense 
ground shaking at various locations, than would have occurred 
if the fault had have ruptured in a uni-lateral fashion.  Both 
finite fault models also indicate one large asperity of high slip 
to the west of the epicentre.  This is likely to have resulted in 
forward directivity effects observed in ground motions to the 
west of the fault, and backward directivity effects to the east 
of the fault (i.e. Christchurch). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  (a) Historical large earthquakes in New 
Zealand.(http://sylph.gns.cri.nz/what/earthact
/earthquakes/historic.html) and  
                  (b) shallow seismicity in the last ten years. 
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/earthquake/) 
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3.3 Rupture dimensions and aftershocks 
Geologists initially mapped the surface trace of the Greendale 
fault as 22 km, but further work has found that now there is 29 
km of surface expression.  As indicated by the finite fault 
models discussed in the previous chapter, the length of the 
fault rupture at depth is likely to be on the order of 40 km.   
There have been numerous aftershocks recorded since the 
Mw7.1 mainshock.  Figure 3.4 illustrates that the temporal 
occurrence of aftershocks has been in line with statistical 
predictions.   
The distribution of earthquakes observed in the Canterbury 
region over the period 24 July – 24 September, which are 
primarily the result of the Mw7.1 mainshock and its 
aftershocks is illustrated in Figure 3.5. The Mw7.1 mainshock 
has triggered many aftershocks on the edges of the Greendale 
Fault, but also on many smaller faults in the general region.  
Although there is some speculation, it is generally considered 
that the occurrence of the Mw7.1 mainshock will result in little 
stress transfer effects to the primary faults in the axial tectonic 
belt (such as the Alpine fault). 
3.4 Ground motion shaking 
The ground motion shaking as a result of the mainshock was 
widely felt in the Canterbury region, and in New Zealand in 
general.  Figure 3.6 illustrates the distribution of “felt-it” 
reports that were submitted online by the public.  Figure 3.7 
illustrates the USGS ShakeMap, which utilizes both predictive 
models of MMI, and also the publicly submitted “felt-it” 
report.  It can be seen that MMI VIII-IX was observed in 
Darfield and Rolleston townships, and that the wider 
Christchurch region generally experienced MMI VI-VII. 
Numerous people and authorities have contrasted the Darfield 
earthquake with the Haiti earthquake as an illustration of how 
adequate building standards and preparedness can lead to a 
large difference in damage and casualties.  However, 
comparison of MMI‟s observed to population exposures in 
Canterbury and Haiti dictates that caution should be made in 
such an interpretation 
(http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/in-earthquakes-
poverty-population-and-motion-matter/). 
 
Figure 3.2:  Finite fault inversion from Gavin Haynes (USGS). 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2010/us2010atbj/finite_fault.php) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Finite fault inversion from ERI. (http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/2010/09/201009_nz_eng/) 
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Figure 3.4: Number of aftershocks with: (a) magnitude greater than 5; and (b) magnitude between 4 and 5, in comparison 
with statistical aftershock models. (http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/sep-2010-darfield-earthquake/gns-science-
response.html) 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Location of earthquakes in the Canterbury region over the period 25 July – 24 September 2010 (i.e. primarily 
the mainshock and its aftershocks). (http://images.geonet.org.nz/maps/quakes/262-christchurch-quake.jpg) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Locations of “felt-it” reports submitted online, there were 6,897 reports as of 24 September 2010. 
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/earthquake/quakes/3366146g-shaking.html) 
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Figure 3.7: USGS ShakeMap from the Mw7.1 mainshock. 
(http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/shak
emap/global/shake/2010atbj/) 
 
The Canterbury region is well instrumented with seismographs 
that can record strong ground motion. Figure 3.8 illustrates the 
(vector-maximum) peak ground accelerations that were 
recorded throughout the region.  In the near source region, it 
can be seen that there are five recordings above 0.7g (although 
many of these peaks are in the vertical component).  The 
maximum 1.25g recorded at the Greendale station has also 
been deemed to have been contaminated by falling debris in 
the house garage in which the seismograph is installed (J. 
Zhao, personal communication). 
Using a wavelet decomposition procedure (Chanerley and 
Alexander, 2010) and integrating the Greendale record with 
and without the anomalous vertical peak at 35 seconds, 
Andrew Chanerley (pers comm.) finds that the horizontal 
velocities and displacements (x-displ. = -1,631 mm;  y-displ. 
=  -458.6 mm) are little affected, with the vertical integrated 
displacement ranging from  -604.7 mm to -664.6 mm.   This 
result suggests that falling debris-induced acceleration spikes 
will have little effect on structural response computations 
(themselves integration processes).  Further, the integrated 
permanent "fling" displacements are consistent with the field 
observations of 3-4 m offset (2 x 1.63 m = 3.26 m). 
Figure 3.9 illustrates a preliminary comparison between the 
attenuation of ground motion intensity with source-to-site 
distance.  The comparison is preliminary in that, as previously 
mentioned, many details of the fault rupture (i.e. the fault 
plane and faulting mechanism) have not been finalised.  
Acceleration Spectrum Intensity (ASI), defined as the integral 
of the pseudospectral acceleration of a ground motion from 
0.1 to 0.5 sec (Von Thun et al. 1988), shown in Figure 3.9a 
illustrates somewhat of a high-frequency average of a ground 
motion, while Spectrum Intensity (SI), defined as the integral 
of pseudospectral velocity of a ground motion from 0.1 to 2.5 
sec (Housner 1952), shown in Figure 3.9b illustrates a 
moderate frequency average of a ground motion.  It can be 
seen that the ground motions from this event by and large 
conform to predictions from empirical ground motion 
prediction equations.  There is however, clear variability in the 
motion amplitudes that occur as a result of near-source effects, 
topography and basin effects, and near-surface nonlinearities 
in the soft fluvial deposited soils that underlie the Christchurch 
region.  
Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12 illustrate the 
recorded acceleration time histories and respective response 
spectra at the Greendale, Christchurch hospital, and Kaiapoi 
strong-motion stations.  Also shown for reference are the 
predicted response spectra from ground motion prediction 
equations (Brendon Bradley, pers. comm.). Locations of these 
seismographs can be found at:  
http://www.geonet.org.nz/resources/network/netmap.html. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Vector-maximum peak ground accelerations observed in the Canterbury region from strong motion seismometers. 
(http://www.geonet.org.nz/news/sep-2010-darfield-earthquake/gns-science-response.html) 
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Figure 3.10: (a) Acceleration time-histories; (b) response 
spectra at Greendale seismograph. (Note that 
"Horiz gm" is the geometric mean of the two 
horiziontal components of motion). 
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Figure 3.11: (a) Acceleration time-histories; (b) response 
spectra at Christchurch hospital 
seismograph. (Note that "Horiz gm" is the 
geometric mean of the two horiziontal 
components of motion). 
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Figure 3.9:  Observations of ground motion intensity compared with empirical prediction equations. The predictive relation 
for ASI and SI are a NZ-specific modification of the Chiou and Youngs (2008) model (Brendon Bradley, pers. 
comm.). 
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Figure 3.12: (a) Acceleration time-histories; (b) response 
spectra at Kaiapoi seismograph. (Note that 
"Horiz gm" is the geometric mean of the two 
horizontal components of motion.) 
 
The Greendale seismograph was located almost directly over 
the fault plane and recorded the strongest ground motion from 
the mainshock. The horizontal components of the ground 
motion indicate that cyclic mobility in surficial soil layers may 
have occurred during the strong ground shaking. The 
occurrence of cyclic mobility is indicated by the high 
frequency spikes in the later half of the strong motion record. 
The spectral accelerations for this set of ground motion 
records are in line with empirical predictions.  
The Christchurch hospital seismograph is located near the 
centre of Christchurch.  The response spectra from this station 
clearly illustrate the significance of basin effects on the 
spectral amplitudes at 2-3 second vibration periods. 
Additionally, the spectral peak at 0.3-0.5 seconds is likely due 
to the near-surface sediments which were rapidly deposited in 
the post-glacial period. 
The Kaiapoi seismometer is located in the town of Kaiapoi, 
which experienced substantial liquefaction and lateral 
spreading.  It can be seen that the ground motions observed 
are generally well above those predicted by empirical models, 
indicating the importance of near surface sediments on site 
amplification. 
 
4. LIQUEFACTION AND LATERAL SPREADING 
In the 2010 Darfield Earthquake widespread liquefaction and 
lateral spreading occurred in various parts of Christchurch 
City (most extensively in the suburbs to the east of the city 
centre, but also in more localised areas to the north and 
southwest of the city), the town of Kaiapoi and the beachside 
settlements near the Waimakariri River. The liquefaction and 
associated ground deformation/failure led to significant 
damage to residential houses and lifeline systems. Particularly 
heavy damage was induced by lateral spreading, which was 
very extensive and severe in areas of South Kaiapoi 
(Courtenay Dr), and very severe but localized in some areas of 
Bexley, Spencerville and North Kaiapoi. Along the 
meandering loops of the Avon River in Avonside and 
Dallington, post-liquefaction settlement and lateral spreading 
was widespread, but lateral displacements were relatively 
moderate. Loose to very loose alluvial fine- to silty sand 
deposits in areas of old (abandoned) river channels, lagoons, 
wetlands and near waterways (streams, rivers) were 
responsible for the widespread liquefaction, lateral spreading 
and ground failures. In view of the extensiveness and severity 
of the effects, one may argue that the most significant 
engineering aspects of the 2010 Darfield Earthquake were 
geotechnical in nature, with liquefaction and lateral spreading 
being the principal mechanisms for the inflicted damage. 
The observations made by the NZ-GEER reconnaissance team 
in these areas are briefly described below. The surveys were 
performed on foot, by car and from a helicopter over a period 
of six days. A broad-brush field reconnaissance was conducted 
in the first two days, followed by pin-point investigations at 
specific locations including detailed site inspections and field 
testing using: Dynamic Cone Penetration Test (DCPT), 
Swedish Weight Sounding (SWS), and Spectral Analysis of 
Surface Waves (SASW). Both DCPT and SWS results 
correlate to the Standard Penetration Test (SPT) N-values, and 
the SASW provides the shear wave velocity profiles. The 
observations from these inspections/in situ tests are also 
detailed below. Figure 4.1 shows the area of interest and some 
of the localities. 
4.1 Christchurch 
Christchurch is situated in the middle part of the east coast of 
South Island. It has a population of about 350,000 (the second 
largest city in New Zealand) and an urban area that covers 
approximately 450 km2. It is sparsely developed with 
approximately 150,000 dwellings (predominantly single-
storey houses with a smaller number of two-storey houses) 
spread across a large area with many parks, natural reserves 
and recreation grounds. The Central Business District (CBD) 
is more densely developed with multi-storey buildings and a 
relatively large number of historic buildings. The epicentre of 
the 2010 Darfield Earthquake was located approximately 40 
km west of the Christchurch CBD. 
4.2 Local geology and liquefaction hazard 
The city of Christchurch is located on Holocene deposits of 
the Canterbury Plains, except for its southern edge, which is 
located on the slopes of the Port Hills of the Banks Peninsula. 
The river floodplain and the loess sediments of the Port Hills 
are the dominant geomorphic features of the Christchurch 
urban area. 
The Canterbury Plains are complex fans deposited by 
eastward-flowing rivers from the Southern Alps to the Pegasus 
Bay coast. The fan surfaces cover an area 50 km wide by 160  
km long. At Christchurch, surface postglacial sediments have 
a thickness between 15 and 40 m and overlie 300-400 m thick 
inter-layered gravelly formations (Brown and Webber, 1992). 
The surface sediments are either fluvial gravels, sands and 
silts (Springston formation, with a maximum thickness of 20 
m to the west of Christchurch) or estuarine, lagoon, beach, and 
coastal swamp deposits of sand, silt, clay and peat 
(Christchurch formation, with a maximum thickness of 40 m 
at New Brighton coast, east of CBD). The soil deposits at 
relatively shallow depths of up to 15-20 m vary significantly 
within short distances, both horizontally and vertically. 
Brown and Weeber (1992) describe the original site conditions 
and development of Christchurch as follows: “Originally the 
site of Christchurch was mainly swamp lying   
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CBD 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Canterbury region, CBD and eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Google Inc. 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: High ground-water table liquefaction potential hazard map for Christchurch. 
(http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/solid-facts-christchurch-liquefaction.pdf; pre-event information 
provided to residents and public by ECan). 
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behind beach dune sand; estuaries and lagoons, and gravel, 
sand and silt of river channel and flood deposits of the coastal 
Waimakariri River flood plain. The Waimakariri River 
regularly flooded Christchurch prior to stopbank construction 
and river realignment. Since European settlement in the 
1850s, extensive drainage and infilling of swamps has been 
undertaken.” Brown and Webber also state that surface 
deposits are actively accumulating and that the present day 
river channel deposits are excluded from the above-mentioned 
Christchurch and Springston formations. 
Canterbury has an abundant water supply through open-
channels (rivers, streams) and very rich aquifers. The 
dominant features of present day Christchurch are the Avon 
and Heathcote rivers that originate from springs in western 
Christchurch, meander through the city, and feed the estuary at 
the southeast end of the city. The ground water table is deepest 
at the west end of the city (at about 5 m depth), gradually 
increases heading east, and approaches the ground surface 
near the coastline. The water table is within 1.0-1.5 m of the 
ground surface for most of the city east of the CBD. 
The high liquefaction hazard in Christchurch was known prior 
to the earthquake, as illustrated by the liquefaction hazard map 
(Figure 4.2) and information provided by the Environment 
Canterbury (ECan: http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/General/ 
solid-facts-christchurch-liquefaction.pdf) to residents, based 
on a study from 2004. 
4.3 Liquefaction manifestation during the Darfield 
earthquake  
The Darfield Earthquake caused widespread liquefaction in 
the eastern suburbs of Christchurch along the Avon River, 
particularly in Avonside, Dallington, Burwood and Bexley. 
Other suburbs, particularly to the east and northeast of CBD, 
were also affected by liquefaction, but to a lesser extent. 
Widespread liquefaction also occurred in Halswell, at the 
southwest end of the city. Pockets of limited or partial 
liquefaction were observed in various parts of Christchurch, 
though these were much fewer to the west of CBD. Figure 4.3 
shows areas of observed liquefaction in the urban area of 
Christchurch based on surface manifestation of liquefaction  
visible in aerial photographs and initial observations from 
ground surveying. The areas most severely affected by 
liquefaction were close to waterways (rivers, streams, 
swamps). The effects of liquefaction were often localized and 
changed substantially over a relatively short distance (50-100 
m) from very severe to low or no manifestation of 
liquefaction. 
4.4 Avonside and Dallington 
Widespread liquefaction occurred in Avonside and Dallington, 
particularly in the areas enclosed within the meandering loops 
of the Avon River. In these areas, the extensive liquefaction 
was accompanied by a complex pattern of lateral spreading. 
Large sand boils adjacent to houses and silty-sand and water 
covering the streets indicated extensive liquefaction in this 
area. Ground cracks with complex patterns indicated either 
lateral spreading features and/or ground distortion due to 
liquefaction including bearing failures. A large number of 
residential houses settled, tilted and suffered 
structural/foundation damage. 
Typical manifestation of liquefaction in the backyard of a 
residential property is shown in Figure 4.4 (Bracken St, 
Avonside). Sand boil ejecta covered most of the lawn and was 
about 200 mm thick in places. There was evidence of massive 
liquefaction and large surface distortion on Bracken St. The 
potable water and sewer systems were out of service at the 
time of the inspections. Despite significant amounts of 
liquefaction ejecta and broken utilities throughout the 
neighbourhood, the house shown in the pictures suffered 
minor damage in terms of differential settlement and cracking. 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed a detailed 
survey at St Paul‟s Church (Gayhurst Rd, Dallington) which 
suffered damage due to liquefaction in the foundation soils 
(Chapter 5). Figure 4.5 shows a complex pattern of ground 
distortion including large cracks and vertical offsets around 
the building. Extensive sand boils covered the paved area 
around the building, backyard lawn, and around the perimeter 
of the building and its foundations. The building suffered large 
differential settlements and severe structural damage. 
 
Figure 4.3: Areas of observed liquefaction (red shaded regions and red points) in Christchurch due to the 2010 Darfield 
earthquake (the liquefaction map is based on surface manifestation of liquefaction visible in aerial 
photographs and compiled evidence from ground surveying). 
257 
 
  
(a) Large sand boils in residential area of Avonside (Bracken St). 
  
(b) The sand boil (grey non-plastic silty sand) in the bottom half of the photo to the left was typical of many locations 
across Christchurch and Kaiapoi where massive liquefaction was observed; at this location, a brown silty sand was 
also found on the ground surface (upper half of the sand boil); photo to the right: University of Canterbury 
postgraduate students perform Swedish Weight Sounding (SWS) test (Bracken St). 
Figure 4.4:  Evidence of extensive liquefaction in residential areas of Avonside. 
 
 
(a) Bearing failure in liquefied soils (St Paul’s Church, Dallington); the crack is 500-900 mm wide with a vertical offset 
of 330 mm, at its maximum. 
  
(b) Evidence of liquefaction in foundation soils resulting in large total and differential settlements. 
Figure 4.5: Liquefaction-induced bearing failure in Dallington (St Paul’s Church, Gayhurst Rd). 
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Specifically, the northwest side of the building was ripped in 
half due to a combination of differential settlement and lateral 
movement. This site is centrally located in a meandering loop 
of the Avon River and bounded by the river on all sides at 
distances of about 150-250 m, except to the north/northeast.  
There was apparent evidence of lateral spreading in this area, 
despite being located more than 150 m from the free-face of 
the river. (Note, however, that this distance is not necessarily 
anomalous. Evidence of lateral spreading has been found at 
distances of up to 2 km from a free-face in the New Madrid, 
Missouri, USA, area (Obermeier, S.F., per. comm.). These 
features manifested during the 1811-1812 earthquakes that 
occurred in that region.) The tension cracks and fissures 
around the building were much bigger than those near the 
river channel, and hence it is possible that they are not directly 
related only to the lateral spreading. Further investigations are 
required to clarify these details. 
Ten days after the event, the team performed Swedish Weight 
Sounding (SWS) tests at Bracken St and in the backyard of St 
Paul‟s Church. SWS is a simple manually operated penetration 
test under a dead-load of 100 kg in which the number of half-
rotations required for a 25 cm penetration of a rod (screw 
point) is recorded (JIS, 1995). One of the advantages of the 
SWS test which was heavily utilized in this investigation is the 
ability to perform the test within a confined space in 
backyards of residential properties. Figure 4.6 shows the 
penetration resistance measured in the SWS tests conducted at 
Bracken St and St Paul‟s Church, expressed in terms of the 
number of half-rotations per metre, NSW. Correlations exist to 
transfer this penetration resistance to an equivalent SPT N-
value. However, the N-value correlations are not presented 
herein. 
Additionally, two Dynamic Cone Penetration Tests (DCPT) 
were performed at the residence shown in Figure 4.4, one in 
the backyard and one in the front yard. The results of the 
DCPTs are shown in Figure 4.7. 
At each of the test locations, a hand auger was used to bore a 
hole down to the layer that liquefied. This layer was identified 
by comparing ejecta material with soil extracted by the hand 
auger. Once at the liquefied layer, the DCPTs were performed 
until the blow count significantly increased or the team ran out 
of DCPT rods (i.e., ~4.6 m below the ground surface). 
There are several different configurations of the DCPT 
equipment available. The one used in these investigations was 
originally designed by Sowers and Hedges (1966) and built by 
Humboldt Manufacturing Co. This system utilizes a 6.8 kg 
mass (15 lb drop weight) on an E-rod slide drive to penetrate 
an oversized 45° apex angle cone. The cone is oversized to act 
as a friction reducer for the rods. The DCPT blow count is the 
number of drops of the weight required to drive the cone ~45 
mm. 
The ground water table at both sounding locations at the 
Bracken Dr residence was at ~0.8 m, and the top of the 
liquefiable layer was at a depth of ~2.1 to 2.4 m. The strata 
overlying the liquefiable layer were clayey. For one of the 
tests, the DCPT rods sank under their own weight 200+ mm, 
indicating very loose sand. Because no samples are recovered 
with the DCPT, the thickness of the liquefied sand layer 
cannot be determined for certain. However, from looking at 
the results shown in Figure 4.7, the penetration resistance 
sharply increases at a depth of ~3.5 m. Additionally, there is a 
very wet, very soft, thin (~100 to 150 mm) clay/plastic silt 
layer that overlies the liquefied layer. It is unknown whether 
this is a very sensitive material that softens as a result of 
earthquake shaking and/or sampling or whether it is a result of 
a water film that formed between the liquefied layer and clay 
layer. 
A DCPT and SASW test were also performed at St Paul's 
Church. The results of these tests are shown in Figure 4.8. 
Based on the bore hole augered for the DCPT test, the water 
table was at a depth of about 2.3 m and the top of the liquefied 
layer was at a depth of about 2.8 m. The SASW test was 
performed approximately 20 m away from the DCPT location. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Post-event penetration resistance in Dallington (St Paul’s Church/School) and Avonside (Bracken St) 
measured in SWS tests. 
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The nonintrusive SASW (Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves) 
method is a common procedure used for obtaining shear wave 
velocity (Vs) profiles for liquefaction analyses (Stokoe et al. 
1994, Andrus and Stokoe 2000, Youd et al. 2001). The SASW 
method is particularly well-suited for relatively shallow 
surveys conducted in areas with limited space where 
conventional multi-channel (MASW) arrays may not fit. 
Furthermore, the equipment used for the tests discussed herein 
is extremely light-weight and portable, and can be transported 
in a small backpack, which makes it ideal for earthquake 
reconnaissance work.  Specifically, these SASW tests were 
conducted using three 4.5 Hz geophones and a „pocket 
portable‟ dynamic signal analyzer (Quattro system) 
manufactured by Data Physics Corporation. The Quattro is 
USB-powered off a laptop and, despite its small size, has four 
input channels, two output channels, 205 kHz simultaneous 
sampling rate, 24 bit ADC‟s, 110 dB dynamic range, and 100 
dB anti-alias filters. A common 4 to 6 kg sledge hammer can 
typically be used as a dynamic source to profile approximately 
6 to 10 m deep with this equipment in less than 15 minutes. 
The Vs profiles must be corrected for overburden pressure 
(Vs1) prior to evaluating soil liquefaction triggering.  
Generally speaking, even without this correction any soil 
layers with Vs less than 150 m/s are quite soft and may be 
potentially liquefiable. However, it will be noted that Vs 
measurements alone cannot definitively determine liquefaction 
susceptibility, as the type of soil (i.e. clay or sand), not just its 
stiffness/velocity, is a key factor. The Vs profile shown in 
Figure 4.8 indicates soft soils down to 8 m depth, with the 
softest soils between approximately 2-4 m. 
Further to the east of Dallington, extensive liquefaction, 
including substantial lateral spreading, was observed in Porritt 
Park (Wainoni), which is enclosed by the Avon River and a 
diverted stream around the park. Large sand boils covered 
substantial areas of the park (Figure 4.9). Parallel cracks 
spaced regularly along drainage lines were indicative of 
slumping and spreading towards the north and south branches 
of the stream. A couple of hockey fields located in the park 
were severely damaged by the liquefaction, resulting in a very 
uneven, bumpy surface of the fields. 
  
Figure 4.7:  Results of DCPT performed at a residence on Bracken St, Avonside. 
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Figure 4.8: Results of DCPT and SASW tests performed at St Paul's Church in Dallington. 
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(a) Aerial view: massive sand boils with large number of parallel cracks along drainage lines (from a helicopter flyover 
on the afternoon of Friday September 10). 
 
(b)  10 cm wide lateral spread crack. 
Figure 4.9: Massive sand boils and lateral spreading cracks at Porritt Park (43.516278°S, 172.689917°E). 
  
(a) Aerial view of the southern edge of Bexley which was severely affected by liquefaction and lateral spreading; (b) 
Evidence of liquefaction in residential area (Seabreeze Cl). 
  
(a) Large ground cracks due to lateral spreading at Kokopu Pl; (d) Cracks in unreinforced slab induced by lateral 
spreading. 
Figure 4.10:  Evidence of extensive liquefaction severely affecting residential houses in Bexley. 
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4.5 Bexley 
Bexley is located further to the east along the Avon River, 
approximately one kilometre from the Avon-Heathcote 
Estuary. It is bounded by the Avon River on the east-side and 
by the Bexley Wetland on the south (Figure 4.10a). The 
residential area was developed in several stages, with the 
southern portion being reclaimed from the wetlands and 
developed in the late 1990s and later on. 
Widespread liquefaction occurred in Bexley, affecting a large 
number of residential houses (Figure 4.10). Ground distortion 
(i.e., differential settlement, large ground cracks, deformation 
of paved surfaces and substantial sand boils) was observed at 
Seabreeze Cl and Kokopu Ln. Residential properties along the 
southern edge of Bexley (along the wetland walkway) were 
severely affected by lateral spreading.  Large movement of the 
walkway towards the water, slumping of the terrace fill and 
large ground cracks on residential properties were observed in 
this area. Similarly, severe manifestation of lateral spreading 
was observed at the east end of Bexley (Parenga Pl). 
An SWS test, DCPT, and SASW test were performed in the 
backyard of a house in Bexley; the results are shown in Figure 
4.11. Based on the bore hole augered for the DCPT test, the 
ground water table was at a depth of ~1.5 m and the top of the 
liquefied layer was at a depth of ~1.6 m. The SASW test was 
performed ~10 m away from the DCPT sounding. 
4.6 Liquefaction manifestation in other areas of 
Christchurch 
Widespread liquefaction also occurred in the suburbs of 
Halswell (southwest of Christchurch) and Brooklands 
(northeast of Christchurch). In Spencerville (also north-east of 
Christchurch), liquefaction occurred and lateral spreading 
affected a limited area. In these suburbs, the manifestation of 
liquefaction and its effects on residential houses and lifeline 
systems were similar to those previously described. Again, the 
severity of liquefaction and associated building damage varied 
even within a given neighbourhood, depending on the soil 
profile, distance from the free face, slope grade, and/or 
structural and foundation details. 
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Figure 4.11:  Results of SWS test, DCPT, and SASW test performed in the backyard of a house in Bexley. 
 
  
(a) Evidence of liquefaction at Peterborough St - Madras St (CBD); (b) Sand boil in the foundation soils of a transmission 
tower (sub-station northeast of Greers Rd – Ruddenklau Ln, Bishopdale) . 
Figure 4.12:  Evidence of limited/partial liquefaction in areas of Christchurch. 
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Limited or partial liquefaction was observed at numerous 
locations across the city, which manifested as scattered and 
relatively small (or within limited area) sand boils. In these 
places there was damage to roads, footpaths, and driveways as 
well as some house damage, but the liquefaction effects were 
moderate or mild. Figure 4.12 shows typical manifestation of 
limited liquefaction in CBD (Peterborough St) and in the 
backyard of a power sub-station on Greers Rd in Bishopdale. 
Other areas where liquefaction of limited extent was observed 
include Belfast (Engelfield Rd, near Main North Rd), 
Redwood (Barnes Rd, near Main North Rd), Fendalton 
(Queens Av), vicinity of English Park in St Alban‟s (Cranford 
St, Westminster St, Courtenay St, Trafalgar St, Sheppard St) 
and Burwood (DeVille Pl and DeBlog Pl). These areas of 
partial/limited liquefaction are shown in the liquefaction map 
in Figure 4.3. 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team also conducted a quick 
drive-through reconnaissance along the Heathcote River, 
specifically targeting areas that were denoted as having high-
potential for liquefaction-induced damage on the ECan 
liquefaction hazard maps (http://ecan.govt.nz/publications/ 
General/solid-facts-christchurch-liquefaction.pdf). However, 
there was very little evidence of ground distortion and 
liquefaction in this area, with only a few sand boils found in a 
period of about two hours of drive-through and on foot 
surveys. 
4.7 Characteristics of liquefied soils 
The ejecta from sand boils in areas affected by liquefaction 
were generally very similar and had several distinctive 
features. They were non-plastic fine sands and silty sands with 
an easily recognizable grey/blue colour. 
Grain-size distribution curves of ejecta samples taken from 
Dallington (Gayhurst Rd), Porritt Park and South Kaiapoi 
(Courtenay Dr) are shown in Figure 4.13a. Figure 4.13b shows 
grain size distribution of soil samples taken from the SWS 
screw point (representative of the deepest layer penetrated in a 
SWS test), which shows significantly higher fines content. 
Figure 4.14 shows the large sandboil from which a bulk 
sample of the sand was recovered. Featherstone Reserve at 
Pines Beach was the location (approximate position 43 22‟ 
52” S 172 42‟ 13” E). 
Figures 4.15-4.18 give electron micrographs of various 
fractions of the sand in relation to sieve size. The micrographs 
are all at the same magnification, 100 times, and show that the 
particles tend to be angular to subrounded in shape. As the 
particle size decreases the angularity of the particles increases. 
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(a) Grain size distribution curves of sand boil samples 
obtained by laser diffraction analysis. 
 
(b) Grain size distribution curves of soil samples taken 
from the SWS screw point (deepest tested layer) 
obtained by sieve and hydrometer analyses: 
Dallington (Nos. 2, 3), Bexley (Nos. 4,6). 
 
Figure 4.13:  Grain-size distribution curves of 
Christchurch and Kaiapoi soils. 
 
Figure 4.14: Sandboil in the Featherstone Reserve Pines Beach from which sand was taken for electron microscope pictures. 
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Figure 4.19:  View of the Bexley Wetland at near high tide 
on Wednesday 29 September 2010. Prior to 
the earthquake this area was inundated at 
high tide. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Photograph of the stream near Porritt Park 
on Wednesday, 15 September 2010. There is 
lateral spreading towards this stream from 
both sides. It is just possible to make out a 
sand boil in the midst of the stream bed 
debris to the right of the duck. Several other 
sand boils were visible along the stretch of 
heaved stream bed. 
 
  
Figure 4.15: Sand particles retained on the 63 micron sieve. Figure 4.16: Sand particles passing the 45 micron sieve. 
  
Figure 4.17: Sand particles retained on the 90 micron sieve. Figure 4.18: Sand particles retained on the 212 micron sieve. 
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4.8 Effects of liquefaction and lateral spreading on 
streambeds and wetlands 
Residents of the Bexley area commented on the effect of the 
earthquake on the Bexley Wetlands. Figure 4.19 shows a view 
from walking path around the south of the subdivision. 
Many sand boils are seen in the bed of the wetland area (at 
high tide on 29 September) which was inundated at high tide 
prior to the earthquake. Stream beds were also noticed to be 
heaved (Figure 4.20). A local resident confirmed that this was 
not how the stream bed appeared prior to the earthquake. In 
some places it was necessary to clear the stream bed soon after 
the earthquake. 
4.9 Google imaging as evidence of liquefaction 
A few hours after the earthquake, a GeoEye image of part of 
the area affected by the earthquake was captured. Since 
Saturday September 04 was a clear day, this image provided 
good evidence of liquefaction in some parts of the city. Figure 
4.21 shows part of the GeoEye image covering Porritt Park 
(location about 43.515555S, 172.685277E; the image date is 
3 September 2010 because GMT, rather than the local time 
and date in Christchurch, is used by Google). Figure 4.9a 
shows a picture of Porritt Park taken from a helicopter on the 
afternoon of Friday, 10 September 2010. 
Comparison of these two images (Figs. 4.9a and 4.21), and 
also observations from on-ground reconnaissance, 
demonstrates that GeoEye is able to give good indication of 
liquefaction. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the key to this  
identification is contrast. The light colour of the ejected sand 
contrasts very well with the underlying green turf. In areas 
where the ejected sand covered the pavement, such as Bexley, 
the GeoEye image did not give such a clear indication of 
liquefaction. 
Local residents commented that on the morning after the 
earthquake the Avon and Heathcote rivers had a milky 
 
Figure 4.21: Sandboil in the Featherstone Reserve Pines Beach from which sand was taken for electron microscope pictures. 
 
Figure 4.22:  Part of Halswell as imaged by GeoEye after the earthquake. The ejected sand is accompanied by considerable 
volumes of water forming mini-lakes having a similar colour to the ejected sand (Google Inc., 2010). 
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appearance. This is because the ejected sand contained enough 
fine material (typically 10 % finer than about 50 microns) to 
stay in suspension for some time when mixed with water. A 
GeoEye image of part of the Halswell area is shown in Figure 
4.22. Extrapolating from Figure 4.21, this figure suggests that 
there are some areas of Halswell where extensive liquefaction 
occurred. However, discussions with local residents revealed 
that a considerable volume of water came to the ground 
surface along with ejected sand, and this water took on a 
milky colour. So, the ejected sand could not be distinguished 
from the water in the satellite image. Some days after the 
earthquake this water had subsided.  
In conclusion, comparison of the GeoEye image with on-
ground reconnaissance confirms that, provided there is enough 
colour contrast between the ejecta and the surrounding ground, 
the satellite image gives a useful indication of liquefaction. 
However, when large volumes of water are ejected with the 
sand there may be a false indication of the amount of ejecta 
present. 
4.10 Town of Kaiapoi 
The town of Kaiapoi (population ~10,000; area ~5 km2) is 
situated about 17 km north of Christchurch, near the north-
eastern end of the Canterbury Plains. At Kaiapoi, recent 
Holocene sediments, approximately 100 m thick, overlie 300-
400 m of late Pleistocene sands and gravels, which in turn rest 
on rock and a greywacke basement rock (Brown and Webber, 
1992; Berrill et al., 1994). 
Present day Kaiapoi is divided into North Kaiapoi and South 
Kaiapoi by the Kaiapoi River (Figure 4.23). At the southeast 
end of Kaiapoi, the Waimakariri River meets the Kaiapoi 
River. The Waimakariri River and its abandoned channels 
significantly influenced liquefaction susceptibility of Kaiapoi. 
As discussed in the Geology chapter of this report and in 
Berrill et al. (1994), before 1868, the Waimakariri River had 
two branches. The north branch flowed in the channel of the 
present Kaiapoi River, and the south branch flowed in the now 
abandoned channel that was located between the present 
Kaiapoi River and Waimakariri River channels (Figure 2.9). 
Several old meander loops of pre-1868 Waimakariri River 
have deposited loose silty sands both north and south of the 
present Kaiapoi River. Also, the ground water table is 
generally shallow within 1-2 m of the ground surface. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23: Map of present day Kaiapoi (Google Inc., 
2010). 
Parts of North Kaiapoi liquefied during the 1901 Cheviot 
Earthquake. Berrill et al. (1994) provide an excellent summary 
of the liquefaction that occurred in Kaiapoi during the 1901 
event. Particularly, they presented historical evidence of the 
occurrence of liquefaction in the northeast section of Kaiapoi, 
at the east end of Charles and Sewell streets. 
4.10.1 North Kaiapoi 
In the 2010 Darfield Earthquake, widespread liquefaction 
occurred north of the Kaiapoi River (Charles St, Sewell St, 
Cassia St) affecting a large number of residential houses.  The 
houses in this area are typically single- or two-storey 
brick/stone block masonry or timber structures on spread 
footings. Figure 4.24 shows areas of severe and moderate-to-
low liquefaction in the town of Kaiapoi. A strong motion 
station located in north Kaiapoi recorded a PGA of 
approximately 0.32g (geometric mean of the horizontal 
components) during the earthquake. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.24: Areas of observed liquefaction in the town of 
Kaiapoi due to the 2010 Darfield earthquake 
(the liquefaction map is based on surface 
manifestation of liquefaction visible on aerial 
photographs and compiled evidence from 
ground surveying). 
 
The liquefaction was particularly intense, producing massive 
sand boils of grey, silty sand, at Cassia Place and at the east 
end of Charles and Sewell streets. In the worst hit area, the 
silty sand ejecta was about 400 mm thick, as shown in Figure 
4.25. Some residents reported geysers appearing in the 
backyard following the earthquake, often forming a small 
pond near the house that remained for several days after the 
event. An SWS test and DCPTs were performed by the team 
in this area, with the SWS test indicating loose/soft soils up to 
depths of 8-9 m (Figure 4.26). 
Kaiapoi River 
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As determined from the bore holes augered for the DCPTs the 
depth to the ground water table and to the top of the liquefied 
layer differed between the two test locations at Cassia Pl 
although the test locations were only ~25 m apart. However, 
the surface elevation of the two test locations differed by 
about 0.5 m. As a result, the elevations of the ground water 
table are similar for the two test locations, with the depth to 
the top of the liquefied layer differing slightly. As with the site 
on Bracken St (Figure 4.4), a 100 to 150 mm thick, very wet, 
very soft clay/plastic silt layer overlies the liquefied layer. 
  
(a)      ~400 mmm thick layer of silt-sand-water mixture covering a residential property affected by very severe liquefaction; (b) 
same-angle view, but after the clean up of sand boils. 
  
(c)      View from the street (before clean up); (d) liquefied silt-sand-water mixture covering the ground outside the house and a 
rug inside the house (seen through a window from inside the house). 
Figure 4.25: Manifestation of very severe liquefaction in residential area at Cass Pl, North Kaiapoi. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4.26: Results of SWS test and DCPTs performed in the backyard of a house at Cassia Pl. 
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In this general area, including near the east end of Charles St 
and Sewell St, the liquefaction led to large settlement of many 
houses, including differential settlement that resulted in 
structural damage. The large ground distortion, cracks and 
fissures in the ground caused significant damage to buried 
lifelines in this area. The intensity of liquefaction gradually 
decreased from severe to moderate-to-mild and no liquefaction 
when moving away to the north or west from the Beswick St-
Cass St-Askeaton Dr block. 
  
(a) Lateral spread and slumping of the north stopbank of 
the Kaiapoi River near the east end of Charles St; note the 
huge piles of cleaned up sand obstructing the view of the 
houses. 
(b) Lateral spreading of the north stopbank of Kaiapoi 
River (Charles St – Jones St). 
Figure 4.27: Evidence of liquefaction and lateral spreading along Charles St and the north stopbank of the Kaiapoi River.  
    
(a) Evidence of extensive liquefaction at the east end of Charles St. 
   
(b) Lateral spreading resulting in a large ground distortion in foundation soils (Charles St). 
Figure 4.28: Liquefaction and lateral spreading in North Kaiapoi. 
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The area along the Pegasus Bay Walkway (from the Kaiapoi 
Visitor Information Centre on the east to Askeaton Park on the 
west) was affected by significant lateral spreading with large 
cracks and fissures in the sloping ground towards Charles St 
(Figure 4.27). Residential houses in this area were affected 
both by liquefaction and lateral spreading (Figure 4.28). The 
reconnaissance team carried out detailed ground surveys of 
lateral spreading along several profiles at this location which 
will be presented in future more detailed publications. In 
addition two bore holes were made using a hand auger. 
However, the profile largely consisted of random fill 
(gravels/cobbles and wood), making it difficult to advance the 
auger. One of the bore holes went down to a depth of ~5.5 m, 
yet a thick liquefied layer could not be found. However, thin 
(< 100 mm) alternating layers of loose saturated sand and very 
wet, very soft clay/plastic silt were encountered, particularly 
near a large lateral spread crack (Figure 4.27b). This lateral 
spread crack had no traces of ejecta in and/or immediately 
near it. This crack was closer to the river than ones that were  
filled with ejecta, which were an additional 30 m further from 
the river. It is possible, that the overlying soil layers slid on 
these alternating layers of loose sand and clay/plastic silt that 
likely liquefied/softened during the earthquake shaking. 
4.10.2 South Kaiapoi 
In South Kaiapoi, the most dominant ground failure feature 
was the liquefaction and massive lateral spreading that 
affected the eastern branch of Courtenay Drive. The area 
affected by lateral spreading, shown in Figure 4.29, was 
approximately 1 km long in the north-south direction and 
extended between 200 m and 300 m inland from the 
Courtenay Stream and Courtenay Lake. The lake was 
artificially created during the construction of the northern end 
of Courtenay Dr. Borrow material was removed from the area 
where the lake is presently located and used as hydraulic fill 
(about 1 m thick) for the northern branch of Courtenay Dr 
(WDC, 2010). 
 
(a)  Sand boils and area affected by lateral spreading around Courtenay Lake (from a helicopter flyover on Friday 
September 10). 
  
(b) Large lateral spread cracks in farm land (at B: 43.3941389°S, 172.659750°E). 
Figure 4.29: Massive lateral spreading at South Kaiapoi. 
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The eastern edge of Kaiapoi is shown in aerial photographs 
taken after the Darfield earthquake (Figure 4.30). The outline 
of the 1865 Waimakariri river channel (Figure 2.9) is shown 
by the dashed red line. On the eastern side of Kaiapoi, the old 
channel passes underneath the present day Courtenay Dr area 
shown as position 1, where severe damage to residential 
properties occurred due to lateral spreading (Figure 4.34). 
Further south at positions A and B (Figure 4.29), large cracks 
due to lateral spreading towards Courtenay Stream are evident. 
Along this stretch from position A to the north-east corner of 
Courtenay Dr (slightly north of position 1), detailed ground 
surveys were conducted along ten transects including 
measurement and mapping of width of cracks, vertical offsets, 
and geo-tagging of major cracks and other lateral spreading 
features. Figure 4.31 indicates geo-tagged major cracks and 
four transects of detailed measurements at position A. 
Further south near the train tracks at position 2 (Figure 4.30), 
large sand boils formed (Figure 4.32). At position 3 (Figure 
4.33), liquefaction resulted in damage to the train tracks.  The 
photo in Figure 4.33 was taken from a position on 
Doubleday‟s Rd in a NNE direction along the tracks, 
indicating ground deformation and track movement. Moving 
north along the train tracks to positions 4 and A (Figure 4.30), 
Figure 4.31 provides a more detailed aerial view of 
liquefaction and lateral spreading crossing the tracks just south 
of Kaiapoi. Using the vehicles in the photo for scale gives a 
good indication of the significant size of these cracks and the 
volume of ejecta. 
 
 
  
Figure 4.30: Aerial view of the lateral spreading area at South Kaiapoi. 
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Lateral spreading resulted in large permanent lateral 
displacements on the order of 1.0-3.5 m with large ground 
cracks of about 0.5-1.5 m wide running through residential 
properties and houses along the east branch of Courtenay Dr. 
In this area, single storey and two storey houses suffered very 
severe damage due to large lateral ground movements 
including large tilt, loss of foundation support, tension cracks 
in foundations and slabs (Figure 4.34). It was significant that 
despite the extreme lateral movement of the immediate 
foundation soils and the foundations themselves, all houses 
showed large ductile deformation capacity and continued to 
carry gravity loads, despite literally being ripped in half in 
some cases. The reconnaissance team visited the area and 
conducted detailed inspections and measurements of the 
distorted houses on several occasions. There was clear 
evidence that the lateral movement, at least in some parts of 
the affected area, continued to develop/increase well after the 
main event. Two consecutive measurements of the width of a 
large ground crack carried out on 11 and 15 September 
showed an increase in width of 200 mm over this period ( i.e. 
from 1.4 m to 1.6 m). The residents of the neighbouring 
property reported new extensive cracks appearing in their 
house over the same time period. It is believed that this 
continued deformation was the result of a combination of 
creep due to static driving shear stresses, significantly softened 
soils and effects of aftershocks on a structure marginally stable 
under gravity loads. 
An SASW test, DCPT and SWS test were performed at a 
home along Courtenay Dr. The results are presented in Figure 
4.35.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.31: Aerial view of the lateral spreading area at position A at South Kaiapoi showing four transects of detailed 
ground surveys. 
 
  
Figure 4.32: Sand boils in fields (position 2; 43.4026ºS, 
172.6503ºE). 
Figure 4.33: Damage to train tracks due to ground 
movement (position 3; 43.4068ºS, 
172.6489ºE). 
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(a) Sand boils and lateral spread cracks. 
                    
(b) Effects of lateral spreading in residential area. 
 
Figure 4.34: Lateral spreading at Courtenay Dr, South Kaiapoi. 
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Figure 4.35: Results of SAWS test, DCPT and SWS test performed at a residential property along Courtenay Dr. 
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4.11 Liquefaction associated with ejected gravel 
4.11.1 Selwyn River near Greendale 
The Selwyn River traverses the Canterbury Plains flowing in a 
roughly south-easterly direction to the south of Christchurch 
and discharging into Lake Ellesmere. 
At the evening meeting of Sunday, 12 September, Pilar 
Villamor of GNS reported to the team that she had seen 
liquefaction in a farm paddock at the Greendale end of the 
fault trace. The paddock was on the Selwyn Forks property 
which is accessed from the Hororata - Dunsandel Rd on the 
southern side of the Hororata and Selwyn rivers. The locations 
of the liquefaction are shown in Figure 4.36. 
The NZ-GEER team visited the area on Monday, 13 
September. On the evening of Sunday, 12 September, there 
had been heavy rain in the area, so on Monday the river 
channels were running high and the Hororata River was 
flowing in new areas because of a stopbank damage induced 
by the earthquake. The team first looked at end of Gillanders 
Rd. on the Darfield side, and found an area with ground 
damage off the end of the track, close to one of the river 
channels (Figure 4.37, Photo 1, BX22 257725 (43 35‟ 48” S 
172 04‟ 48” E). 
A short distance from here at the end of Gillanders Rd, the 
team found damage to the unsealed pavement and in the grass 
verge nearby. Evidence of liquefaction was seen (Figure 4.38, 
Photo 2, BX22 258726).  Notable here was the fine gravel on 
the surface of the sand. Also note that rain had fallen the 
previous evening so the surface of the ejected material would 
have been altered somewhat. 
The liquefaction was located on the Selwyn Forks property 
(map reference BX22 250727). Access was a little difficult 
because a farm creek was being fed from an errant tributary of 
the Hororata River. The liquefaction was distributed across 
several fields. Material was ejected from fissures in the ground 
which are likely to be lateral spreads given the stream 
channels nearby. The ejected material was topped off with a 
layer of coarse gravel (Figure 4.39). Figure 4.40 shows not 
only sand and gravel but also clods of topsoil. It is not clear if 
the gravel was part of the liquefied layer or was carried to the 
surface with the ejected sand. When questioned, Mr Ridgen 
suggested that the ground profile consisted of topsoil, gravel 
and then sand. If this profile is confirmed then the gravel is 
probably carried to the surface by the liquefied sand coming 
from below.  
Further liquefaction has been reported up the Selwyn beyond 
the Selwyn Forks property. The team has not been able to 
confirm this by their own inspection. 
Selwyn Forks farm buildings
Photo 1 (BX22 257 727)
Photo 2 (BX22 258 727)
Photo 3 (BX22 252 728)
Photo 4 (BX22 249 729)
 
Figure 4.36: Location of the liquefaction along the Selwyn River in the Greendale region. (Date of Google image October 
23, 2009). 
  
Figure 4.37: Ground damage adjacent to the bank of the 
Selwyn tributary near the end of Gillanders 
Rd (Darfield side). (Position marked as 
Photo 1 in Fig. 4.36). 
Figure 4.38: Liquefaction on the grass verge adjacent to 
the end of Gillanders Rd (Darfield side). Note 
the fine gravel particles on the surface and 
the fissure towards the top right hand side ‐ it 
was possible to push the sampling spoon to a 
depth of about 300 mm into the fissure. 
(Position marked as Photo 2 in Fig. 4.36). 
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4.11.2 Selwyn River near Irwell 
Further liquefaction adjacent to the Selwyn River, not far from 
the town of Leeston, was evident of the Willow Lea property 
near Irwell (Figure 4.41). 
Figure 4.42 shows the material ejected at the position labeled 
Photo 5 (Figure 4.41, Lincoln BX23 479 626 (43 41‟ 17” S 
172 21‟ 12” E) illustrating that the material ejected consisted 
of sand with some gravel. Comparison of photos in Figures 
4.39, 4.40 and 4.42, shows that the materials ejected at Selwyn 
Forks and at Willow Lea were similar. 
The farmer at Willow Lea, Mr Mark Fleming, reported that 
the fissures he observed were at least 2 m deep based on 
probing with a length of number 8 fencing wire. He also 
explained that the width of the fissures had increased 
gradually since the earthquake and that the prominence of the 
ejected sand had decreased with time (the photograph in 
Figure 4.42 was taken on September 29). More instances of 
liquefaction have been reported on other properties further 
down the Selwyn River, but the team has not confirmed this 
by site visits. 
4.11.3 Near Clearwater 
Liquefaction also occurred near the Clearwater development 
along Johns Road (43 27‟ 15.96” S and 172 35‟ 42.89” E). 
Figure 4.43 shows that gravel was ejected in addition to sand. 
There were a number of other instances of liquefaction in the 
open ground adjacent to the example illustrated in Figure 4.43. 
4.12 Most Distal liquefaction feature  
The most distal liquefaction features from the epicentre and 
fault rupture that the team members found or heard about are 
in Waikuku Beach, north of Kaiapoi along the coast, and in 
Akaroa, southeast of Christchurch on Banks Peninsula. The 
site-to-source distance to Akaroa is slightly more than to 
Waikuku Beach. The epicentral distance and closest distance 
to the fault rupture for the Akaroa site are ~54 and 44 km, 
respectively. These distances are plotted in Figure 4.44, along 
with data from worldwide earthquakes compiled by 
Ambraseys (1988). As may be observed from this figure, the 
epicentral distance falls well within the boundary for 
maximum distance, but the closest distance to the fault rupture 
is close to the boundary formed by data from other 
earthquakes. 
  
Figure 4.39: Material ejected from a fissure on the Selwyn 
Forks farm (front paddock). Note the gravel 
overlying the brown coloured sand. This is 
what was visible after a night of rain. 
(Position marked as Photo 3 in Fig. 4.36). 
Figure 4.40: Ejected material on another paddock of the 
Selwyn Forks farm (Sheepyard paddock). As 
well as sand and gravel the ejecta contain 
clods of topsoil. (Position marked as Photo 4 
in Fig. 4.36). 
 
Willow Lea homestead
Selwyn River
Photo 5 (BX23 479 626)
Photo 6 (BX23 475 626)
 
Figure 4.41: Location of the liquefaction along the Selwyn River in the Irwell region. (Date of Google image July 13, 2009). 
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5. IMPACT ON BUILDING STRUCTURES  
5.1 General 
Major impacts to building structures during the Darfield event 
of September 4, 2010 were related to unreinforced masonry or 
brick (URM) buildings and residential areas where ground 
failure below or nearby the foundation was observed. Modern 
structures supported on stable ground in general performed 
well. Many URM and brick structures, particularly in the 
Christchurch business district, suffered complete or partial 
collapse due to strong shaking (e.g. Figure 5.1). All of these 
structures were under 3 stories, with most being 1-2 stories 
(about 70%). Of the 595 URM buildings in Christchurch 
surveyed by city inspection teams immediately following the 
earthquake, 21% were assigned usability ratings of red, 32% 
yellow, and 47% green (Moon, 2010; Ingham and Griffith, 
2010). The structural damage to URM and brick buildings, 
where ground failure was not observed, is being documented 
by the EERI and other post-earthquake reconnaissance teams. 
Interested readers should consult their reports for 
comprehensive documentation of the structural performance 
of buildings where ground failure did not impact performance.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Structural collapse of a URM in the 
Christchurch Business District. (184 
Manchester Street). Photograph courtesy of 
Assoc-Prof Jason Ingham. 
  
Figure 4.42: Ejected sand and gravel at the Willow Lea 
property (position marked as Photo 5 in Fig. 
4.41). 
Figure 4.43: Ejected sand and gravel in the Clearwater 
area (photo by Ian McCahon). 
 
 
Figure 4.44:  Comparison of the most distal liquefaction feature from the Darfield Earthquake with worldwide earthquake 
data collected by Ambraseys (1988). (Adapted from Rathje et al., 2010). 
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Ground failure including liquefaction and lateral spreading 
resulted in extensive damage to both new and old 
construction, impacting houses, light commercial, school and 
church buildings within neighbourhoods. The most prevalent 
type of damage included extensive subsidence, tilting, and 
separation of the structural components of the building. 
Importantly lateral spreading ground was observed to have 
detrimental impact on light residential construction. Slab 
foundations did not provide sufficient restraint of the ground 
movement to preclude extensive structural separation in many 
situations where excessive ground spreading features were 
observed. In this chapter of the report, several important cases 
that provide insight regarding the effects of ground failure on 
buildings are documented. 
5.2 Kaiapoi area 
5.2.1 Kaiapoi small business area 
Small businesses line the fronts of Charles Street paralleling 
the Kaiapoi River from approximately Jones St to Davie St 
(Figure 5.2). The vintage of these structures vary, however, 
most are single or 2 stories and constructed of light wood 
framing with brick façade, or stucco, or solely of concrete 
masonry block. Extensive lateral spreading parallel to the 
Kaiapoi River extended into the small business and residential 
regions impacting numerous structures within this community. 
Liquefaction was evident beyond the lateral spread as 
discussed in Chapter 4. The most severe damage to structures 
within the small business community along Charles Street is 
shown in Figures 5.3-5.9. The Gospel Way church for 
example, a single storey structure of brick construction, 
suffered separation of its heavy front structure from its 
orthogonal support walls due to lateral movement of the 
ground towards Charles Street (Figures 5.3-5.5). The large 
lateral ground spreads extended northeast along the 
longitudinal axis of the building as evident in the adjacent 
parking area (Figure 5.4). This ground movement manifested 
into distinct shear cracks at the brick-mortar joints (Figure 
5.5a). Structural separation such as that evident in Figure 5.5a 
was visible at several distinct locations extending along the 
longitudinal axis of the building. The most severe damage was 
evident at the front of this building, which settled 
approximately 150 mm, while the eastern length of the 
building remained approximately level (Figure 5.5b). 
A small shopping area neighbouring the New World 
supermarket in Kaiapoi (between Williams and Jones streets 
north-south and Sewell and Charles streets east-west) showed 
patterns of extensive ground damage and resulted in many 
business closures (Figure 5.6a). Closures were primarily 
prompted by extensive hardscape and interior flooring damage 
(Figure 5.6b). These buildings attached units of one storey 
wood framed construction supported on slabs on grade and 
with glass front (open) facing as is common of walking 
business districts. The tallest structure to suffer damage in the 
direct adjacency to these business units was a red-tagged 3-
storey property and family law office constructed of concrete 
masonry block units (CMU) (Figures 5.7-5.8). This structure 
is rectangular in footprint with little to no lateral resistance 
along the longitudinal axis of the building (as evident from the 
perimeter full facing glass openings – Figure 5.7a). The short 
axis of the building provides resistance to lateral movement 
and loads via stiff full length CMU walls at exterior ends of 
the structure (Figure 5.7b). The front of this building appeared 
to have settled and rotated towards the direction (southwest) 
(Figure 5.8). Lateral spread ground failure and liquefaction 
ejecta were evident directly adjacent to this building (Figure 
5.9). A sample of material taken adjacent to this building was 
tested using laser diffraction scanning (Figure 5.10, denoted 
WP24).  
Movement of the Kaiapoi wharf resulted in damage to the 
historic Kaiapoi Railway Station, which is now renovated and 
used as the Kaiapoi Information Centre (43.3838°S, 
172.6596°E) and its neighbouring Harbour Building 
(43.3834°S, 172.6591°E). The Kaiapoi Information Centre 
building is a renovated wood framed building on an elevated 
foundation (Figure 5.11). As a result of loss of ground support, 
this building tilted approximately 5 degrees northeast (away 
from the river). Rapid stabilization of the building had been 
complete by the time of the NZ-GEER team visit on 11 
September 2010 in the form of concrete footings poured on 
the exposed (near river) foundation side of the building 
(Figure 5.11b). In addition, tension tie-backs anchored from 
newly poured concrete footings to a patio area were used to 
stabilize the upper pavement during the continuing ground 
movement. The Harbour building is a one-storey masonry 
block building that suffered tilting towards the river and 
separation from the wharf of approximately 150-250 mm on 
its west face (Figure 5.12). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Kaiapoi North residential and small business region. Annotated GoogleEarth image. 
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Figure 5.3: Front facing (view looking northeast) of the 
Gospel Way church in Kaiapoi along Charles 
Street.  
Figure 5.4: Lateral spread patterns extending east along the 
longitudinal axis of the Gospel Way church in 
Kaiapoi along Charles Street.  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.5: Gospel Way Church in Kaiapoi: (a) Shear crack pattern developed at brick-mortar joints along the northern side of 
the building and (b) separation (settlement and rotation) of the west face of the building.  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.6: Small business attached units neighbouring the New World supermarket in Kaiapoi (Charles St). (a) View looking 
east showing ground damage pattern and (b) resulting hardscape damage at the front of one business unit.  
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North of the Kaiapoi Information Centre and Harbour 
Buildings, a two storey wood frame building with 
subterranean parking (nearest to river) and a full floor level 
(nearest to Charles Street) currently housing the Bridge 
Tavern building was extensively damaged due to ground 
movement (Figure 5.13). Although movement of the retaining 
wall adjacent to the Kaiapoi River was not evident, the east 
embankment side, which supported the first storey 
subterranean parking area showed evidence of ground 
settlement and cracking. This damage precipitated movement 
of columns supporting the upper storey of the building (Figure 
5.13b).  
Soil samples taken from the largest visible ground ejecta 
features within the park adjacent to the Kaiapoi River liken the 
material to that observed within the small business district of 
Kaiapoi (Figure 5.10). These grain size distribution curves 
indicate the material directly adjacent to the wharf and likely 
extending into the neighbouring park is a uniformly graded 
sandy soil with about 10% fines (Table 5.1). In contrast 
material further from the rivers‟ edge (e.g. WP24 taken within 
the small business district of Kaiapoi) although similarly 
sandy and uniformly, graded contains a more appreciable 
amount of fines (30%). The largest content of fines of these 
samples approached 70% (WP169 taken at the Lyttelton Oil 
Terminal). 
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Figure 5.10: Grain-size distribution of samples taken from 
ejecta observed in Kaiapoi area (sample taken 
11 September 2010 testing via laser 
diffraction).  Sample WP24 taken at 
43.381856°S, 172.659149°E (adjacent to law 
offices) and sample WP28 taken at 
43.384723°S, 172.661314°E (adjacent to 
Kaiapoi wharf). 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.7: Property and Family Law Offices in Kaiapoi business district. (Williams St.) (a) View looking northwest (at long 
axis end) of building and (b) view looking northeast showing shear wall ends of short axis of building. 
 
 
  
Figure 5.8: Property and Family Law Offices in Kaiapoi 
business district. (Williams St). View looking at 
west short axis end of the building.  
Figure 5.9: Surrounding ground failure patterns directly 
adjacent to the Property and Family Law Offices 
in Kaiapoi business district. View looking 
southeast.  
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Table 5.1 Summary of laser diffraction testing results 
WP Location GPS Coordinates %Fines 
D10 
(mm) 
D30 
(mm) 
D60 
(mm) Cc Cu 
WP24 Kaiapoi business 
43.3819S°, 
172.6591E° 30 0.037 0.075 0.129 1.179 3.486 
WP28 Kaiapoi adjacent to wharf 
43.3847°S, 
172.6613°E 10 0.075 0.129 0.214 1.038 2.851 
WP104 Bexley Residential 
43.5190°S, 
172.7202°E 10 0.075 0.127 0.185 1.168 2.463 
WP169 Lyttelton Oil Terminal 
43.6088°S, 
172.7142°E 70 0.023 0.042 0.065 1.164 2.813 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.11: Renovated Kaiapoi Railway building now used the Kaiapoi Information Centre, adjacent to the Kaiapoi Wharf. (a) 
View looking northwest and (b) view looking southeast (note the temporary elevated patio support tie-backs and 
newly poured footings at the front (river side) of the building. 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.12: Harbour building adjacent to the Kaiapoi River and wharf structures. (a) View looking southeast and (b) view of 
the northwest corner of the building. Note the approximate 150-250 mm gap between the pavement and building.  
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5.2.2 Kaiapoi residential 
The most severe structural damage to houses in the Kaiapoi 
residential neighbourhoods was evident along Charles Street 
paralleling the Kaiapoi River (Kaiapoi North) as well as along 
Courtenay Drive, which parallels a branch of the Courtenay 
Stream (east of Kaiapoi South) (Figure 5.14).  
Kaiapoi North – Residential construction within the Kaiapoi 
North community consists of 1-2 storey wood or concrete 
block framed homes. A number of homes are also constructed 
of brick or wood with brick façade units. The vintage of these 
homes appeared to extend as early as 1960s construction, to 
more recent completely rebuilt or remodelled homes. Uniform 
settlement of the heavier brick constructed residential homes 
in this area, such as shown in Figure 5.15, were measured as 
large as 200-250 mm. 
Brick homes consistently observed shear cracking, 
discontinuities between window and door openings and brick, 
popped out and/or damaged glass windows, and damage to 
floor slabs and hardscape (Figure 5.16). Homes along Charles 
Street at the time of the NZ-GEER team visit (11 September 
2010) were either red or yellow tagged. Very few homes were 
occupied, with most suffering extensive sand ejecta 
surrounding the home as well as settlement. In a number of 
cases, residents of severely damaged homes had moved out 
completely (e.g. Figures 5.17-5.18). This house at Charles 
Street experienced approximately 0.4 m of settlement along its 
North face (Figure 5.17b). Sand ejecta were present 
surrounding most homes along Charles Street and extending 
east into the North Kaiapoi residential area approximately 0.5 
km. 
 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.13: Bridge Tavern adjacent to the Kaiapoi River. (a) view looking northwest at Williams Street bridge and (b) view 
looking northwest at subterranean parking.  
 
 
Figure 5.14: Kaiapoi North residential and small business region.  Annotated GoogleEarth image. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.15: Residence along Charles Street. (a) Ejecta surrounding home and (b) owner points out shear cracking and gapping 
developed between window and brick due to structures movement.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Residence along Charles Street (same structure as Figure 5.16). Damage to glass windows and between window 
and wall. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.17: Red tagged residence on Charles Street. (a) View looking east and (b) north end of house, view looking North-East.  
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Kaiapoi South – In general damage to building structures in 
the Kaiapoi South community was limited to Courtenay Drive 
between Kaikanui Street and ending at Parish Lane. This is a 
residential neighbourhood with relatively new homes, all 
constructed within the last ten years. Most homes are one-
storey light wood framing or brick supported on unreinforced 
slabs with perimeter stemwall foundations and light metal 
roofing. An example of the typical construction style in this 
area is shown in Figure 5.19. Liquefaction was reported to 
inundate the neighbourhood north of Courtenay Drive towards 
Charters Street, however much of this had been cleaned up by 
the time of the NZ-GEER team visit and appeared to have 
minimal impact on the homes. The impact to homes along 
Courtenay Drive however, and particularly those on the east 
side of the drive, with direct facing to a paddocks‟ field as 
well as a branch of the Courtenay Stream, was extensive. 
Ground failure in this region manifested in large lateral spread 
zones coupled with liquefaction (Figure 5.20). 
A manual survey by the NZ-GEER team indicated that of the 
44 homes along this drive 48% suffered severe structural 
damage induced by ground failure, while 15 (36%) suffered 
moderate and minor damage, respectively. Laterally spreading 
ground was observed to extend through the backyards of these 
homes, with the lack of reinforcement within slab foundations 
and general light construction styles resulting in severe 
separation of the home directly in-line with the ground failure. 
The residences shown in Figures 5.21-5.24 demonstrate the 
observed damage due to excessive ground movement. The 
structure shown in Figures 5.21-5.22 suffered excessive tilting 
and a separation of 1.5 m from its approach driveway to the 
front of the home (Figure 5.22a), while the rear of the home 
collapsed inward due to surrounding ground fissures (Figure 
5.22b). Similarly, the residence in Figures 5.23-5.24 
articulated little to no damage at the backside of the home 
(Figure 5.23), however the front entry of the home at the 
interface between the garage and main portion of the residence 
suffered a separation of about 1m due to lateral ground 
movement (Figure 5.24). 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.18: Red tagged residence on Charles Street. Extensive surrounding ejecta at perimeter of home. 
 
  
Figure 5.19: Typical construction style of homes along 
Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community.  
Figure 5.20: Ground failure feature extending through the 
backyard of a home on the south side of 
Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential 
community. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.21: Damage to a residence at Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential community (front of home articulating 
excessive tilt and separation of foundation from surrounding hardscape).  
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.22: Damage to a residence at Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential community (a) front of home (1.5 m 
separation between garage and approach slab) and (b) back of home.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.23: Damage to a residence along Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential community.  Rear of home facing 
Paddocks field articulates relatively no damage.  
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5.3  Dallington Area 
5.3.1 Dallington Residential 
The Dallington residential community was heavily impacted 
by liquefaction, and where the Avon River meanders through 
the community, those structures nearest the river were 
impacted by lateral spreading (see Chapter 4 for details 
regarding liquefaction extent in this area). The structural 
impact on residences was largely localized to settlement and 
rigid body movement in these regions, with the exception of 
St. Paul‟s church and surrounding school (refer to subsequent 
section) and residences nearest to the Avon River which 
suffered loss of ground support due to lateral spreading. 
Residential construction in this area appeared to be range in 
vintage, with the oldest houses constructed in the early 1900s 
and predominant construction dates from 1960s for the rest. 
Most structures were brick or light wood framing with stucco 
finish and 1-storey. A few structures had been remodelled to 
incorporate a second storey. The foundation system of these 
residential structures appeared to be stem walls with floating 
slabs or in some cases elevated wood flooring was apparent as 
viewed from access crawlspaces. Residents interviewed in this 
neighbourhood indicated that, following the mainshock, the 
sand ejecta with thicknesses on the order of 600-700 mm 
encompassed in many cases their entire property. 
Two common types of damage to residential structures within 
this community are shown in Figures 5.25 and 5.26. Both of 
these structures are located near the Avon River. The 
residence shown in Figure 5.25a directly fronts the Avon 
River and experienced approximately 3 degrees of rigid body 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.24: Damage to a residence along Courtenay Drive in the South Kaiapoi residential community.  Front entry articulates 
extensive damage as large ground spreading subtends into the superstructure.  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.25: (a) Rigid body rotation of a residence in Dallington (Locksley Avenue) due to liquefaction and (b) lateral spread 
features directly fronting the home. Surveys of ground features at this location are associated with T7 (refer to 
Figure 5.27).  
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tilt directly south towards the river. Structurally the home was 
in good condition, though inspection of the interior articulated 
extensive floor and nonstructural damage. Lateral spreading 
extension features were observed at the front of the residence 
at the river and continued north behind this residence (Figure 
5.25b). Transects taken by the NZ-GEER team on 14 
September 2010 at this location indicate 85 cm of lateral 
extension fronted the residence, with vertical offsets in 
extensions as large as 190 mm and cracks extending as great 
as 1.05 m (T7 in Figure 5.27). Figure 5.26 shows a house in 
Locksley Avenue, which illustrates a loss of ground support 
subtended along the structure length. At this location lateral 
spreading towards the Avon River (behind the position from 
which the photo was taken) is evident in the driveway. 
Differential settlement along the length of the house manifests 
itself as shear cracking and separation of the mortar-brick 
within the brick veneer wall. This mode of deformation is 
similar, but less intense, to that imposed on the slab-on-ground 
foundations of the houses illustrated in Figures 5.20-5.24.  
Detailed mapping of lateral spreading features extending from 
the Avon River into the Dallington residential community 
were performed by a NZ-GEER team on 14 September 2010. 
A map of these transect locations is shown in Figure 5.27. 
Future reports will include elevations and additional details of 
these ground features. 
5.3.2 St. Paul’s Church and School 
A historically significant feature in the neighbourhood of 
Dallington is the St. Paul‟s church and surrounding school 
(Figure 5.28; 43.5196°S, 172.6725°E). St. Paul‟s church was 
severely damaged due to surrounding ground movement, 
which was precipitated by extensive liquefaction within the 
general area shown in Figure 5.28. Most significantly the 
structure suffered through building separation due to ground 
extension and vertical offset subtending north-south 
approximately one-third of the length along the west end 
(orange separation location denoted in Figure 5.29). 
This resulted in structural separation of the building into two 
distinct structures. The West end of the building rotated 2 
degrees south and 4 degrees west (Figures 5.30-5.33), 
resulting in 460 mm of settlement of the south-west corner 
(estimated with reference to prior ground elevation). No 
significant lateral translation of the building was measured at 
its perimeter rather structural movement was confined to 
rotation and settlement as described in Figure 5.29. This 
relatively heavy single storey structure was constructed of 
running bond brick perimeter walls, with a timber (truss) roof. 
Wall heights were approximately 8 m at the perimeter of the 
sloping roof and 5.5 m at flat portions. An approximately 12 m 
tall tower is articulated at the southeast corner of the structure 
(Figure 5.33b). The ridgeline extends across the longitudinal 
axis (running approximately east-west) along the building. 
 
Figure 5.26: Residence affected by lateral spreading along the driveway which has induced differential settlement between the 
front and rear of the house. (Note that this is not a slab-on-ground house, rather an older style of construction with 
a concrete perimeter beam and the timber floor being supported on shallow foundations; Locksley Ave). 
 
Figure 5.27: Ground feature mapping locations taken by the NZ-GEER team on 14 September 2010 (Annotations overlaid with 
GoogleEarth image). 
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The north and south (long axis ends) of the building articulate 
approximately 25% glass windows. Similarly the East entry 
facing Gayhurst Road presents stained glass features 
surrounded by brick walls (Figure 5.33b). The foundation was 
not accessible at the time of the NZ-GEER team‟s visit. 
Surrounding St. Paul‟s church is an Integrated State school 
affiliated with the church (buildings denoted B1-B8 in Figure 
5.28). Building B1 (Figure 5.34) and B6 (Figure 5.36) are 
constructed of running bond brick perimeter walls with light 
metal roofs, whereas buildings B4, B5, and B7 incorporate 
light wood framing along their longitudinal axes and brick 
along their transverse axes (e.g. Figure 5.37). Building B2 is 
constructed of concrete masonry block units (Figure 5.35). 
All structures within the school appeared to be supported on 
elevated stem wall footings with interior wood joists, with the 
exception of B2, which appeared to be at grade with a slab on 
ground. Buildings B1-B8 are all single storey with wall 
heights ranging from 7-8 m. Stiff brick and CMU buildings 
within this school complex suffered shear cracking and in 
some cases significant separation of brick-mortar joints (e.g. 
Figures 5.35b and 5.36b). Likewise mixed construction 
structures, such as building B7 suffered damage due to relative 
movement between contrasting materials (Figure 5.37b). 
Flexible wood buildings suffered little observable structural 
damage with the exception of hairline cracks in stucco aligned 
with ground movement features. 
 
 
Figure 5.28: St. Paul’s church and school in Dallington area (43.5196°S, 172.6725°E). Notation “B#” is used for reference only 
to identify adjacent buildings (see discussion). Annotated GoogleEarth image. 
 
Figure 5.29: St. Paul’s church damage map – survey conducted 12 September 2010; Global dimensions approximate (extracted 
from Google Earth image), deformation obtained directly in the field. 
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Figure 5.30: St. Paul’s church in Dallington area - overall 
view of building looking north-east. 
 
Figure 5.31: St. Paul’s church in Dallington area - view 
looking north at ground failure, which continued 
through the building. 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.32: St. Paul’s church in Dallington area - view looking north (a) far view of separated west end of building and (b) 
close-up view of structural separation.  
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 5.33: St. Paul’s church in Dallington area: (a) view looking east at the west end and (b) view looking west at the east end.  
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Figure 5.34: St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B1 (on left) and St. Paul’s church (on right). 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.35: St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B2: (a) view looking west and (b) view from north side of 
building, looking south. 
 
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.36: St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B6 view looking south: (a) overall view of building and (b) 
west end of building.  
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5.4 Bexley Residential Area  
In the residential area of Bexley, homes were significantly 
affected by lateral spreading (e.g. Figures 5.38-5.39). The 
lateral spreading was apparent from walking around the path 
along the southern boundary of the subdivision next to the 
wetland. Fissures of 300 mm or greater in width traversed the 
ground of several properties. A floor slab fissure (estimated 
width 50 to 75 mm, visible because the carpet had been lifted) 
extended across the full width of one house. Settlement had 
occurred but with relatively little tilting. Given that the fissure 
went through the concrete floor slab, there appeared to be 
relatively little damage to the walls. 
Foundation details taken during a visit to one home in Bexley 
are shown in Figure 5.40. The system set-out in Figure 5.40 is 
a perimeter beam with two D16 bars, D10 starter bars 600 mm 
long at 600 mm centres around the edges. The cavity inside 
the perimeter beam is filled with coarse gravel, covered with 
dampcourse, and then topped with a 100 mm thick concrete 
slab, which, apart from the starter bars, is mostly unreinforced. 
The drawing in Figure 5.40 specifies mesh reinforcing in areas 
that are to be tiled or covered in vinyl. Nonetheless, 
reinforcing was not observed to cross any fissure as noted in 
the drawing. 
For contrast, an open foundation construction in the Pines 
Beach area (near Kaiapoi) was observed on 12 September 
2010. The perimeter footing had been completed and the 
gravel fill was in place, the concrete slab was yet to come. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.37: St. Paul’s church and surrounding school - Building B7: (a) view looking east and (b) view of south-west corner of 
building articulating column damage at wood-brick interface.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.39: Fissure in concrete floor slab (to the left hand 
side passing beneath the ladder). (Same house as 
in Figure 5.38.) (Kokopu Street). 
 
Figure 5.38: Lateral spreading compromising ground 
support beneath the concrete slab-on-grade 
house foundation. (Kokopu Street). 
 
 
Figure 5.40: Concrete slab-on-ground details for the Bexley 
houses. 
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Assuming the top of the perimeter footing was close to level 
before the event, it was apparent that the footing was not 
capable of withstanding the ground deformation during the 
earthquake as the footing was no longer level (Figure 5.41). 
Two D16 reinforcing bars were observed in this footing where 
cracking had occurred. 
Concrete slab-on-grade foundations have been used in New 
Zealand for single and two storey timber framed houses for 
more than 40 years. The current code covering this type of 
construction is NZS3604:1999 “Timber framed buildings”, 
which has evolved from previous versions dated 1984 and 
1990. The slab-on-grade details shown in Figure 5.40 appear 
to be in compliance with the NZS3604 which allows, for 
single storey dwellings, unreinforced floor slabs in dry areas 
but requires mesh in wet areas. The application of NZS3604 is 
based on the concept of “good ground”. If the site satisfies this 
condition then no additional engineering design is required as 
the developer is able to follow the details set out in NZS3604. 
Site conditions that exclude the application of NZS3604 are 
specified as peat, soft clay and expansive clay, all of which are 
identifiable using rudimentary site investigation techniques. 
 
Figure 5.41: Site at Pines Beach which appears to be 
using the same slab-on-grade system as at 
Bexley (Chichester Street) 
Liquefiable soil is not mentioned. Preliminary site 
investigations, conducted following this earthquake, indicate 
that the liquefiable layer is often deeper than 1 m and not 
infrequently deeper than 2 m (Figure 5.42). This means that 
the possibility of liquefaction is not as easily identifiable as 
the above three “good ground” exclusions. 
5.5 Spencerville Residential Area 
The residential communities of Spencerville and Brooklands 
were significantly impacted by liquefaction and lateral 
spreading induced ground damage. Lateral spreading was 
confined to regions along the Styx River (Figure 5.43), 
whereas liquefaction was pervasive throughout these two 
small communities, but particularly along the regions nearest 
the Brooklands Lagoon. Particularly significant structural 
damage due to laterally spreading ground was observed along 
Riverside Lane paralleling the Styx River (inset on right of 
Figure 5.43). Here five large and newly constructed (all within 
the last 10 years) homes were severely damaged due to 
laterally spreading ground (Figures 5.44-5.47). These houses 
were relatively large structures (200-300 m2), compared to 
other developments in or surrounding Christchurch, and each 
appeared to be a custom design. All appeared to be resting on 
slab foundations with either light wood framing or brick/CMU 
walls. Unlike other areas affected by the earthquake, little 
ejected sand was observed, however strain relief manifested in 
the form of large lateral spreading ground fissures up to 400-
500 mm in width in the worst places. The houses suffered only 
minimal settlement, however the laterally spreading ground 
continued through the homes, tearing ground slabs apart and 
propagating structural damage upwards towards the roofline 
(the roofline damage pattern here was not unlike that seen at 
St Paul‟s church in Dallington). From perimeter and interior 
views of the foundations of these homes, no reinforcing steel 
appeared to be present in the main slab. Residential structures 
in this area with the most severe damage were those with their 
longitudinal axis in the direction of the lateral spreading. 
Lateral spread features were long and extended through many 
properties (e.g. Figure 5.48). One home oriented with its long 
axis perpendicular to the direction of lateral spread had some 
damage at the connection between the garage and the house 
proper, but, unlike the others, was still occupied. 
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Figure 5.42: Results of the DCPT for the liquefiable layer for Spencerville (left: 43.43075˚S, 172.693000˚E; 43.431583˚S, 
172.693233˚E), Bexley (middle: 43.518370˚S, 172.722050˚E) and Courtenay Drive (right: 43.390010˚S, 
172.662640˚E). 
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Figure 5.43: Spencerville and Brooklands communities (inset on right identifies surveys conducted by NZ-GEER team on 14 
September 2010 along Riverside Lane); Annotated Google Earth image. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.44: Ruptured floor slab near the front entrance of Riverside Lane. Clearly visible is the gravel infill shown in Figure 
5.41 (note that there appears to be no ejected sand present). (a) ground fissure separating front entry of home and 
(b) same ground feature propagated through home and departing on opposing side.  
 
  
Figure 5.45: Interior view of residence at Riverside Lane. Note 
the two floor breaks visible in the picture  
 
Figure 5.46: Lateral spread adjacent to residence at 
Riverside Lane. The location of this fissure is 
about 26 metres from the nearby Styx River. 
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5.6 Summary Remarks 
The above descriptions of structural damage as induced by 
ground failure lead to the conclusion that lateral spreading 
places much more severe demands on structures and 
particularly their foundations than that of liquefaction alone. 
Most importantly in this earthquake, residential structures 
were severely impacted by ground failure. Specifically, the 
following observations can be made: 
 Large lateral spread fissures in many cases split 
entirely ground slabs and further propagated damage 
upward into structural walls and rooflines, in some 
cases creating severe structural separation.  
 Geometric and reinforcing detailing for residential 
foundations appeared to consistently incorporate 100 
mm thick unreinforced concrete slabs resting on 
perimeter footings reinforced with 2-D16 bars 
(Figure 5.44). 
 In areas with significant liquefaction where little to 
no lateral spreading occurred, the main foundation 
response was settlement (uniform and/or tilting). In 
the worst instances the settlement was up to several 
hundred millimetres, however often with 
comparatively mild tilting. 
In areas with little to no lateral spreading, slab-on-ground 
foundations appeared to cope with modest amounts of 
liquefaction. 
 
6. PERFORMANCE OF STOPBANKS (OR LEVEES) 
AND OXIDATION POND EMBANKMENTS 
6.1 History of stopbank construction 
Shortly after their arrival in the Canterbury area in the mid-
nineteenth century, the western settlers started constructing 
drainage systems and stopbanks (or levees) along rivers 
(Larned et al., 2008). Particularly, flooding of the Waimakariri 
River and tributaries posed a constant threat to the 
Christchurch and Kaiapoi areas. Early efforts to contain the 
rivers within their banks were piecemeal and only partially 
successful. To better coordinate the efforts, the Waimakariri 
River Trust was established in 1923 (Griffiths, 1979). In 
response to the 1926 floods (Figure 6.1), the Trust 
implemented a major river improvement scheme in 1930, 
known as the Hays No. 2 Scheme. Among other things, the 
scheme entailed an overall improvement of the stopbank 
system along the Waimakariri River. However, these 
improvements were unable to prevent the major floods in 
1940, 1950, and 1957. These floods prompted a further river 
improvement scheme in 1960, which entailed benching 
existing stopbanks and construction of new stopbanks, which 
were compacted with vibrating rollers (Boyle, 2010). The 
stopbanks were designed to provide protection against the 
100-year flood (Griffiths, 1979). Unfortunately, the 
geotechnical reconnaissance team has not yet been able to 
obtain construction drawings and/or specifications used in 
either the 1930 or 1960 improvement schemes for the 
stopbanks and are uncertain if such drawings/specifications 
exist. 
 
Figure 6.1: 1926 photograph of the Waimakariri River 
overflowing its banks in Christchurch. (Te 
Ara Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 2010). 
 
6.2 Seismic performance of stopbanks 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed damage 
surveys along stretches of the primary and secondary 
stopbanks for the Waimakariri River and along the primary 
stopbanks for the Kaiapoi River on the morning of the 
earthquake (4 September 2010) and then again a few days 
later (between 9-16 September 2010) . The surveys were 
performed on foot, in an automobile, and from a helicopter. 
Figure 6.2 shows the stretches of the stopbanks that the NZ-
GEER Team surveyed. The geotechnical reconnaissance team 
also corresponded with the Environment Canterbury (ECan) 
personnel (Ian Heslop and Tony Boyle) who are overseeing 
damage assessments and repairs of the stopbanks damaged 
during the earthquake. Below is a summary of the observed 
performance of the stopbanks along the Waimakariri and 
Kaiapoi Rivers.   
  
Figure 5.47: House with fissured floor slab with damage 
carried through to the roof line which is no 
longer weather proof. (Riverside Lane, 
Spencerville). 
Figure 5.48: Separated fence line due to propagating ground 
fissure meandering between homes along 
Riverside Lane.  
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6.2.1 Waimakariri River stopbanks 
The Waimakariri River is the largest of the rivers in northern 
Canterbury and flows from the Southern Alps to the Pacific 
Ocean. The mean annual flow of the river is 120 m3/sec. 
However, in 1957 the largest flood on record occurred, which 
had an estimated peak discharge of 4,248 m3/sec (Griffiths, 
1979). This flood is estimated to have a 100 year return period 
and was used as the design basis flood for the stopbank 
improvement scheme implemented in the 1960s. 
Overall, the stopbanks along the Waimakariri River performed 
well during the earthquake, with only ~4 km out of ~17 km of 
stopbanks requiring repair (Boyle, 2010). The majority of the 
damage along the Waimakariri River was downstream of SH1 
(Figure 6.3).  Repairs to the high priority sites were expected 
to be completed within a few weeks after the earthquake, with 
medium priority sites expected to be completed in a couple of 
months. The cost of the repairs to the high and medium 
priority sites is estimated to be ~$NZ 3m (Boyle, 2010).  
Figures 6.4-6.9 are photographs of the stopbanks for the 
Waimakariri River along Coutts Island Rd. Numerous sand 
boils were found along the base of the stopbank for an ~0.5 
km stretch (Figures 6.4-6.6), on both the river and land sides. 
By the time of the team's damage survey on 11 September 
 
Figure 6.2: White lines denote the stretches of the stopbanks along the Waimakariri and Kaiapoi Rivers that the geotechnical 
reconnaissance team performed damage surveys. Also denoted in the figure is State Highway 1 (SH1). 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Post-earthquake damage survey of stopbanks performed by Riley Consultants for Environment Canterbury along 
the Waimakariri River, downstream of SH1, and Kaiapoi River. (Riley Consultants, 2010; courtesy of Ian Heslop 
and Tony Boyle, ECan). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
293 
2010, the top of the stopbank along this stretch had already 
been regraded (Figure 6.7), likely to fill in longitudinal cracks 
that formed along the crest of the stopbank. Figure 6.8 is of a 
~20 mm wide longitudinal crack in the crest of the stopbank, 
located just outside of the ~0.5 km stretch where the crest road 
had been regraded. It is assumed that the longitudinal cracks in 
the stretch of the stopbank where the crest road had been 
regraded were more significant than that crack shown in 
Figure 6.8, thus warranting the regrading. The liquefaction 
along the base of the stopbank and longitudinal cracks in the 
crest abruptly stopped outside of the ~0.5 km stretch; this may 
be seen in Figure 6.9, where no damage to the stopbank could 
be found. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Photo 1: Large sand boil at the base of the 
landside of the stopbank on Coutts Island Rd. 
(43.425018˚S, 172.628442˚E). 
 
  
Figure 6.5: Photo 2: Crack running along base of stopbank 
on Coutts Island Rd (landside) and liquefaction 
ejecta. (43.424466˚S, 172.629907˚E). 
Figure 6.6: Photo 3: Liquefaction ejecta (centre of photo) 
along the base of the stopbank on Coutts Island 
Rd (riverside). (43.424093˚S, 172.630468˚E). 
  
Figure 6.7: Photo 4: Road on top of stopbank that had 
recently been regraded, presumably after the 
earthquake to fill in longitudinal cracks formed 
during the earthquake. Liquefaction was 
observed along the base of both sides of the 
stopbank along this stretch. (43.423943˚S, 
172.631045˚E). 
Figure 6.8: Photo 5: ~20 mm wide crack running lengthwise 
along the top of the stopbank on Coutts Island 
Rd. This crack was at the edge of the ~0.5 km 
stretch of the stopbank where significant 
liquefaction was observed. Photo taken looking 
southwest (43.423440˚S, 172.632349˚E). 
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From interviews with local land owners, this section of the 
land that experienced widespread liquefaction was part of an 
old river channel. This was confirmed by review of old maps 
of the area. Figure 6.10 is an aerial image of the Coutts Island 
Rd area with the 1865 south branch of the Waimakariri River 
channel highlighted in red. The ~0.5 km stretch of the 
stopbank where liquefaction was observed is denoted by the 
dashed yellow line (A) in this figure. As may be seen in this 
figure, the area that liquefied coincides with the location of the 
old river channel, while the stretches of stopbank with no 
observed liquefaction (dashed blue line) lie outside of the old 
river channel. 
Three Dynamic Cone Penetration Tests (DCPT) and four 
Spectral Analysis of Surface Waves (SASW) tests were 
performed along the base of the stopbanks along Coutts Island 
Rd, both in the areas that did and did not liquefy (Figure 6.11). 
The results of these tests are presented in Figures 6.12-6.14. 
The DCPT is performed in a hole hand augered down to the 
top of the liquefied layer, with this layer identified by 
comparing sand boil ejecta with soil extracted with the auger 
at various depths. The test is performed until there was a 
noticeable increase in the DCPT N-value or we ran out of rods 
(~4.6 m from the top of the ground surface. (See the 
Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading chapter for a more 
detailed description of the DCPT test). 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Photo 6: Stretch of stopbank without evidence of liquefaction. In the distance, a small rise can be seen in the road. 
This rise is the start of the ~0.5 km stretch where liquefaction was observed along the base of the stopbank. 
(43.4225˚S, 172.6350˚E). 
A
B
 
Figure 6.10: Overlay of 1865 stream channel on present day Coutts Island Rd. This image is ~3.5 km across (centre 43.4266˚S, 
172.6302˚E) (Google Inc. 2010). 
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Figure 6.11: Photos 7 and 8: DCPT (left: 43.425137˚S, 172.628619˚E) and SASW test (right: 43.424342˚S, 172.630473˚E) 
performed in areas that did and did not liquefy along the stopbank on Coutts Island Rd . 
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Figure 6.12: Results from SASW tests (left: SASW1 43.425029˚S, 172.628676˚E; middle: SASW3 43.424351˚S, 172.630475˚E) 
and DCPT (right: DCPT1 43.425139˚S, 172.628618˚E) performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts Island 
Rd in an area that liquefied. 
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Figure 6.13:  Results from SASW test (left: SASW2 43.426294˚S, 172.625439˚E) and DCPT (right: DCPT1 43.426186˚S, 
172.625673˚E) performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts Island Rd in an area that did not liquefy. 
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Other than SASW3 and DCPT1, performed about 175 m from 
each other in an area that liquefied, the agreement between the 
SASW and DCPT results is not very good in terms of depth to 
a stiff, presumably nonliquefiable layer. Further analyses are 
required to fully understand why. However, the sites that did 
not liquefy were along the banks of the old river channel. A 
liquefiable layer could not be found in these areas using the 
hand auger, and the soil profiles (DCPT2 and DCPT3) 
consisted of clayey sand and peat. Given the depositional 
environment of these profiles, it is likely that the strata varied 
significantly laterally, which could be the explanation for the 
poor agreement between the DCPT and SASW test results.  
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 are photographs of a secondary 
stopbank for the Waimakariri River along State Highway 1. 
This stretch of the stopbank is denoted by a dashed yellow line 
(B) in Figure 6.10. Liquefaction was observed on both sides of 
the stopbank and longitudinal cracks were observed running 
along the crest and sides of the stopbank (Figures 6.15 and 
6.16). As may be seen from Figure 6.10, this stretch of the 
stopbank lies within the abandoned river channel of the old 
south branch of the Waimakariri River.  
6.2.2 Kaiapoi River stopbanks 
Kaiapoi is located at the north-eastern end of the Canterbury 
Plains, about 20 km north of Christchurch. The Kaiapoi River 
used to be a part of the eastern reach of the old north branch of 
the Waimakariri River (Griffiths, 1979) and cuts through the 
centre of Kaiapoi. The Kaiapoi River joins the Waimakariri 
River on the eastern edge of town and flows to the sea (Figure 
6.2). Liquefaction was widespread along the northern and 
southern banks of the Kaiapoi River and adjacent 
neighbourhoods. 
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Figure 6.14: Results from SASW test (left: SASW4 43.422635˚S, 172.635038˚E) and DCPT (right: DCPT3 43.422685˚S, 
172.635081˚E) performed along the base of the stopbank on Coutts Island Rd in an area that did not liquefy.   
  
Figure 6.15: Photos 9 and 10: ~50 mm wide longitudinal cracks running along the crest (left) and base (right) of a secondary 
stopbank for the Waimakariri River. Photo taken looking southwest; SH1 on left of stopbank (43.430108˚S, 
172.643434˚E). 
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The stopbanks confining the flow of the Kaiapoi River 
suffered damage at various locations (Figure 6.3). These 
embankments, measuring about 2.5 m high (from the water 
line at the time of our observations) and 2.7 m wide, have 
slopes of approximately 2H:1V on the riverside and 3H:1V on 
the landside near the Williams St. bridge, which remained 
serviceable after the earthquake despite incipient liquefaction 
in the abutments and settlement and cracking of the approach 
on the eastern side of the bridge.  
In downtown Kaiapoi adjacent to the river, the Visitors' 
Information Centre on the north side of the river sank and 
tilted as a result of liquefaction and lateral spreading (Figure 
6.17). Ground cracks, as wide as 300 mm and as deep as 1 m, 
were observed running parallel to the river near this structure.   
The two-storey Waimakariri-Ashley Coastguard building 
adjacent to the Visitor Centre also suffered the same effects. 
Just east of this building (~100 m), ground cracks, on the order 
of 1 m wide and 1.85 m deep were also observed along the 
gentle inboard (land-side) slope of the stopbank (Figure 6.18). 
Lateral spread cracks with massive ejecta were observed at the 
toe of the embankment (Figure 6.19). Also, a skate park that 
was located about midway up the gently sloping inboard side 
of the stopbank was severely damaged by lateral spreading 
(Figure 6.20). Settlement/slumping of the foot path on the 
crest of the stopbank on the order of 100-300 mm were also 
noted. Detailed maps of the largest lateral spread cracks will 
be provided in subsequent versions of this report. 
  
  
  
  
Figure 6.16: Photos 11 to 14: Liquefaction ejecta on both the river and landsides of the stopbank. (43.428968˚S, 172.645435˚E). 
 
Figure 6.17: Photo 15: Visitors Information Centre on the stopbank on the north side of the Kaiapoi River. The location of this 
photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.387384˚S, 172.659743˚E). 
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Two bore holes were made using a hand auger near the lateral 
spread cracks (43.384767˚S, 172.661133˚E and 43.384683˚S, 
172.661350˚E). However, the profile largely consisted of 
random fill (gravels/cobbles and wood), making it difficult to 
advance the auger. One of the bore holes went down to a depth 
of ~5.5 m, yet a thick layer of soil matching the liquefaction 
ejecta material could not be found. However, thin (< 100 mm) 
alternating layers of loose saturated sand and very wet, very 
soft clay/plastic silt were encountered, particularly near the 
large lateral spread crack shown in Figure 6.18. This lateral 
spread crack had no trace of ejecta in and/or immediately near 
it. This crack was closer to the river than ones that were filled 
with ejecta at the toe of the stopbank ~30 m away (Figure 
6.19). 
Houses across from the stopbank on Charles St underwent 
significant earthquake-induced settlement. This damage is 
discussed in detail in the Impact on Structures chapter.   
Further east along the Kaiapoi River (~400 m), the ground 
adjacent to a 6 m diameter structure (containing an 
underground tank and control equipment) settled by about 300 
mm, resulting in damage to pipes attached to the tank (Figure 
6.21). Additionally, aerial photographs of lateral spreading 
along the north bank of the Kaiapoi River going east from the 
town centre are shown in Figure 6.22. 
  
 
  
Figure 6.18: Photos 16-18: Lateral spread cracks along landside of the stopbank on the north side of the Kaiapoi River. The 
locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.384484˚S, 172.660653˚E). 
  
Figure 6.19: Photos 19-20: Lateral spreading cracks along the landside of the stopbank on the north side of the Kaiapoi River. 
The locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.384633˚S, 172.661231˚E). 
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Figure 6.20: Photo 21: Skate park on the stopbank on the 
north side of the Kaiapoi River. The location of 
this photograph is denoted in Figure 6.2. 
(43.384094˚S, 172.660370˚E). 
 
Figure 6.21: Photo 22: Settlement of tank structure. The 
locations of these photographs are denoted in 
Figure 6.2. (43.386918˚S, 172.664412˚E). 
  
Figure 6.22: Photos 23 & 24: Aerial photographs of lateral spreading of stopbanks on the north bank of the Kaiapoi River. The 
locations of these photographs are denoted in Figure 6.2. (left: 43.387389˚S, 172.666173˚E; right: 43.386875˚S, 
172.672297˚E). 
 
  
Figure 6.23: Photo 25: Lateral spread cracks along riverside 
stopbank on the south side of the Kaiapoi River. 
The location of this photograph is denoted in 
Figure 6.2. (43.385254˚S, 172.660131˚E). 
Figure 6.24: Photo 26: Lateral spread cracks along the 
riverside stopbank on the south side of the Kaiapoi 
River. The location of this photograph is denoted in 
Figure 6.2. (43.385839˚S, 172.660941˚E). 
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The stopbank along the south bank of the Kaiapoi River also 
experienced extensive lateral cracking, and the adjacent homes 
on Raven Quay experienced significant post-earthquake 
settlement. Figures 6.23-6.26 are photographs of the stopbank 
on the south bank of the river. 
6.3 Seismic Performance of Oxidation Pond 
Embankments 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team also performed damage 
surveys on foot at the sewage treatment plant oxidation pond 
embankments in Bromley and Kaiapoi. 
6.3.1 Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant 
The Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant, operated by the 
Waimakariri District Council, is located between Kaiapoi and 
Pines Beach and is bordered to the south by the Waimakariri 
River stopbank. From 2001 to 2003, the average and peak 
daily inflows were 3,235 and 10,695 m3/day, respectively, and 
the average and peak daily outflows were 1,163 and 5,565 
m3/day, respectively (CH2M Beca Ltd., 2003). An aerial 
image of the plant is shown in Figure 6.27. 
The geotechnical reconnaissance team performed a damage 
survey on foot of the stopbanks along the southern perimeter 
of the plant, denoted by the white line in Figure 6.27. No 
damage was observed along this stretch of the stopbanks, 
although the team observed large lateral spread cracks (~300 
mm wide) in the stopbanks and shoreline about 100 m west of 
  
Figure 6.25: Photo 27: Lateral spread cracks along the top of 
the stopbank on the south side of the Kaiapoi 
River. The location of this photograph is denoted 
in Figure 6.2. (43.385693˚S, 172.660688˚E). 
Figure 6.26: Photo 28: Failed drainage conduits running 
underneath the stopbank on the south side of the 
Kaiapoi River. The location of this photograph is 
denoted in Figure 6.2. (43.388679˚S, 
172.666203˚E). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.27: Aerial image of the Kaiapoi Sewage Treatment Plant. The southern perimeter (~0.6 km) of the oxidation ponds 
(bottom of image) forms the stopbanks of the north side of the Waimakariri River. (43.384583˚S, 172.688240˚E). 
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the southwest corner of the plant (Figure 6.27). Photographs of 
the liquefaction and lateral spread features at this location are 
shown in Figure 6.28. 
6.3.2 Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant 
The wastewater treatment plant operated by the Christchurch 
City Council is situated at Bromley, approximately 6.5 km 
east of the Christchurch CBD and southwest of the Bexley 
subdivision. Here the domestic and industrial wastewater of 
Christchurch is treated before being discharged to the ocean 
via an outfall that discharges 3.2 km off the coastline. The 
treatment system comprises screening, sedimentation tanks, 
trickling filters, clarifiers and tertiary treatment within the 
oxidation pond system before discharge to the outfall. The 
capacity of the outfall is 5.5 m3/s and the treatment plant was 
operating at around 2 m3/s at the time of the earthquake. The 
oxidation ponds were constructed in the early 1960s and cover 
an area of around 230 ha (Figure 6.29). 
Dyers Road along State Highway 74 cuts through the 
oxidation ponds and connects the northern approaches to 
Christchurch with the port of Lyttelton to the south. Road 
pavements were cracked at the side of the oxidation ponds 
(between Ponds 2A and 3) and the road was impassable 
following the earthquake. According to the engineer 
interviewed at the site, a 500 mm wide crack had opened near 
the centreline of the road, although it was already filled with 
compacted dense graded aggregate during the site visit (Figure 
6.30). Nevertheless, longitudinal cracks were still evident on 
the side of the road (Figure 6.31). 
The middle third of the Pond 1/2A embankment sustained the 
most severe failure throughout the pond system over a length 
of around 450 mm. At this location there are multiple deep 
longitudinal cracks along the embankment. The cracks were 
1.5 m deep and up to 700 mm wide at the top. Many of the 
cracks were interconnected and some were transverse to the 
embankment, running from Pond 1 to Pond 2A. There is a 
1.22 m diameter concrete pipeline beneath Pond 1 which can 
take flow from the treatment plant and bypass it directly to 
Pond 4. This pipeline "floated" over several hundreds of 
metres by up to 1.2 m in elevation, but typically less than 300 
mm (Figure 6.32). During site inspections on Monday 6th and 
Tuesday 7th September 2010 there were no observations that 
the pipeline had "floated". Also examination of the Google 
GeoEye image taken hours after the earthquake showed no 
trace of this pipe. The pipe was firstly observed to have 
"floated" on the 9th September 2010 as the pond water level 
was being lowered as part of the emergency mitigation 
measures.  
The discharge weir structure at the outlet of Pond 2B has three 
pipes that transfers flow to Pond 3. The pipelines consist of 
  
  
Figure 6.28: Liquefaction and lateral spread features on or near stopbanks located about 100 to 200 m west of the Kaiapoi 
Sewage Treatment Plant. (upper left: 43.389175˚S, 172.683235˚E; upper right: 43.389701˚S, 172.683390˚E; bottom 
left: 43.389519˚S, 172.682203˚E; bottom right: 43.389432˚S, 172.6682060˚E). 
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two original pipelines of 900 mm diameter and a larger more 
recent pipeline of 1.80 m diameter. 
The weir structure is located out into the pond and allows flow 
over individual weirs on all four sides. Each of the three 
pipelines became dislocated in the gap between the structure 
and the embankment allowing water to flow directly into the 
pipelines at the gaps formed in the pipe separations. 
Furthermore, sink-holes were formed on the embankment 
berms and in the middle of Dyers Road indicating that the 
pipes had separated beneath the embankment fill (Figure 
6.33). The eastern end of Pond 2B was cracked and the 
internal side of the embankment had slumped into Pond 2B by 
up to 400 mm at its eastern end. The slumping was also 
evident along most of the length of the Pond 2A/2B internal 
baffle which was recently constructed in 2004. Sand boils 
were also evident along the toe drain which runs along the 
northern side of Ponds 2B, 3 and 6 (sand boils were rare on 
top of the embankments). 
Extensive cracking was experienced along the majority of the 
embankment that separates Ponds 3 and 6. The total length of 
this embankment is around 600 m in length and severe to 
moderate cracking was experienced over a length of about 450 
m. Several sets of cracks were noted to exist across the width 
of the embankment at the worst affected locations. The larger 
of the cracks were around 400 mm to 500 mm in width and 
around 1.5 m deep. The base of the crack was not visible due 
to either pond water or collapse debris blocking its lower 
extent. A small sinkhole had formed over the outlet pipeline 
from the northernmost weir structure in Pond 3. As with the 
pipelines beneath Dyers Road, it would appear that the 
pipeline was either broken and/or the spigot had been pulled 
from its collar allowing soils to fall down in to the pipeline. 
Numerous small sand boils were encountered across the floor 
of the estuary adjacent to Pond 6. One of these sand boils was 
observed to be flowing water 80 hours after the main 
earthquake.  While not directly inspected, when viewed at low 
tide it appeared that there has been considerable liquefaction 
along the alignment of the outfall pipeline (commissioned in 
2010) which traverses across the estuary to the New Brighton 
spit. A large volume of ejecta appears to be located near to the 
main channel in the estuary (location of thinnest cover over 
the pipeline). 
The distortion of the embankments noted above is indicative 
of bearing failure of the embankment as it has settled and 
spread into the liquefied sub-soils, with large tension cracks 
forming through the fill used to form the embankments and 
pulling apart of concrete pipelines as the fill has spread. Site 
investigations undertaken indicate that the soils beneath the 
pond embankments are potentially liquefiable to depths of 10 
m to 15 m. 
Because of the slumping of the pond banks, engineers decided 
to drop the pond water levels and reduce the hydraulic 
pressures on the embankments. At the time of the 
reconnaissance team visit, sheet piles were being driven into 
the Pond 3/6 embankment to stabilize it and arrest further 
movement (Figure 6.34). Furthermore, the pipelines beneath 
Dyers Road were being replaced. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.30: Repaired Dyers road that runs between Ponds 
2A and 3.  (-43.529933˚, 172.715200˚). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.29: Aerial image of the Bromley Sewage Treatment Plant. (-43.535029˚, 172.714052˚). 
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Figure 6.31: Lateral spread cracks running parallel to Dyers Road 
adjacent to Pond 2A. (-43.531393˚, 172.712473˚). 
Figure 6.32: Buckled pipe protruding from Pond 1  
during pond dewatering, and after pond level was 
 lowered. Pipeline crown was at the pond invert prior 
 to the earthquake. (-43.530867˚, 172.705190˚). 
                          
Figure 6.33: Lateral spread cracks at the eastern end of Pond 2B. The sink hole in the foreground of the photo on the right 
formed over the top of two outlet pipelines. (-43.52895˚, 172.717300˚). 
 
  
Figure 6.34: Sheetpiles being driven to stabilize the pond embankment to arrest further movement.  (-43.530563˚, 172.718349˚). 
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7. EFFECTS ON LIFELINES 
Over the past decade, the people of Canterbury have 
undertaken a deliberate and dedicated effort to increase the 
resiliency of the entire lifeline system within the region. And, 
with the exception of water and waste water distribution lines 
in the areas affected by liquefaction, lifelines performed quite 
well. The case for hardening of the lifelines was made in the 
report “Risks and Realities: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to 
the Vulnerability of Lifelines to Natural Hazards” (CAENZ 
1997). Following preparation of the report, a plan to enhance 
the resiliency of lifelines in Canterbury was developed and 
implemented across all sectors, including transportation, 
water, waste water, electric power, and communications. In 
addition, the interdependence of lifelines was recognized and 
addressed through detailed planning and coordination efforts. 
This chapter includes the NZ-GEER Geotechnical Team 
observations for the transportation system (bridges, highways, 
rail, airports, and ports), water and wastewater systems, 
electric power, waste management and landfill, as well as 
other lifelines. 
7.1 The Transportation System 
While the transportation system did suffer some damage from 
the earthquake, mobility about the Canterbury region was 
essentially unaffected with few exceptions.  
7.2 Bridges, abutments, and approach fills 
In general, the performance of bridge foundations, abutments, 
and approach fills in the earthquake was satisfactory, as 
almost all bridges were serviceable after the event.  According 
to post earthquake reconnaissance performed by the New 
Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge Research Group, 
eight road bridges were out of service in the days following 
the earthquake, and five remained closed for at least 5 days.  
One bridge with a ruptured sewer line crossing it (the Kainga 
Road Bridge in Brooklands) remained out of service for more 
than 11 days after the earthquake.  However, that bridge may 
have remained closed at the request of local authorities to limit 
access by outsiders to an area extensively damaged by 
liquefaction. Except for one bridge with structural damage, 
these bridge closures were due to damage on the approaches to 
the bridge, e.g. liquefaction, lateral spreading, and settlement 
of approach fills.  However, none of the road bridges were 
damaged to the extent that they will need immediate 
replacement.  Six pedestrian bridges were unserviceable after 
the earthquake and will need to be replaced.  While these 
pedestrian bridges suffered significant structural damage, the 
primary factor inducing structural distress in most of these 
cases appears to have been liquefaction-induced lateral 
spreading at the abutments.  In several cases minor leaks in 
water pipes crossing road bridges were reported. One railway 
bridge was reported to need repair. 
The geotechnical bridge reconnaissance team conducted visual 
inspections of six road bridges, one railway bridge, and two 
pedestrian bridges.  However, in some cases the inspection 
was limited to visual observation from a distance.   There was 
no apparent major damage to bridge foundations, although one 
abutment wall founded on piles appears to have back-rotated 
slightly.  At several of the vehicular bridges, liquefaction-
induced lateral spreading was observed in the approach 
embankments, abutment fills, and in the banks adjacent to the 
bridge.  At road bridge locations where lateral spreading, or 
incipient lateral spreading, was observed in the abutments, the 
tendency for the abutments to converge (move inwards 
towards the centre of the span) appears to have been resisted 
by the bridge deck, though there was typically signs of lateral 
spreading of the approach embankments perpendicular to the 
roadway.   Cracking of abutment retaining walls was observed 
at several of these road bridge locations.  At the two 
pedestrian bridges that the team visited the light deck did not 
have enough structural strength to resist movement into the 
channel at the abutments and the bridge decks buckled to 
accommodate the convergence of the abutments.  At the 
Kainga Road Bridge, the ruptured sewer pipe crossing the 
bridge continued to discharge untreated sewage into the river 
for at least 12 days after the earthquake. More detailed 
descriptions of the NZ-GEER Reconnaissance Team's findings 
follows. 
7.2.1 South Brighton (Bridge Street) Bridge 
Perhaps the most significant damage at the road bridges 
observed by the geotechnical bridge reconnaissance team was 
at the Bridge Street bridge in South Brighton (43.5253˚S, 
172.7242˚E), an approximately 70 m span with a centre pier 
and seat type abutments and a slight skew (less than 30 
degrees) spanning the Avon River.  The bridge was reportedly 
closed for approximately 10 days following the earthquake 
due to differential settlement at the east abutment.  When the 
Team arrived on the 11th day after the earthquake, dense 
graded aggregate had been placed and compacted on the 
approach to the east abutment (Figure 7.1) and traffic was 
moving across the bridge once again.  Cracking along the 
margins of the roadway and incipient lateral spreading 
perpendicular to the roadway was observed (Figure 7.2).  
There was also incipient spreading along the river bank on 
both sides of the east abutment (Figure 7.3).   Closure of the 
gap between the bridge deck and abutment at the seat for the 
deck (Figure 7.4) as well as displacement on the bearing pads 
(Figure 7.5) suggests that the abutment moved slightly 
towards the channel.  However, the abutment wall is supported 
on several rows of 14 inch octagonal precast, pre-stressed 
concrete piles, including a row of batter piles (piles installed 
on an angle) with a 3:1 batter (inclination), as observed at the 
west abutment where the piles are exposed (Figure 7.6).  
Incipient lateral spreading of the bridge abutment, lateral 
spreading along the banks of the river (Figure 7.7), and 
closure of the gap at the bridge seat were also observed at the 
west abutment.  The west abutment also appeared to have 
back-rotated slightly, possibly due to liquefaction-induced 
settlement of the approach fill, as evidenced by a gap between 
the back wall and the end fill (Figure 7.8) and tilting of the 
approach slab at the wing wall (Figure 7.9).  There also 
appeared to have been some pounding between the south edge 
of the west end of the bridge deck and the abutment wall 
(Figure 7.4). The New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform 
Bridge Research Group has reported a thin horizontal crack 
just above the water line on the centre pier of this structure.  
However, both the bridge superstructure and its foundations 
appeared to be structurally intact and the bridge has been 
reopened for traffic.  
7.2.2 Christchurch Avon River Bridges (Swanns Road, 
Gayhurst Road, Pedestrian Bridge) 
Incipient lateral spreading of the bridge approach fills and 
abutments walls and cracking of abutment walls were 
observed at bridges across the Avon River in Christchurch at 
Swanns Road (43.5222˚S, 172.6600˚E) and Gayhurst Road 
(43.5217˚S, 172.6728˚E).  Both bridges are relative small 
(approximately 30 m) simple spans with integral abutments 
constructed in 1954.  At both locations cracking in the 
roadway on the approaches to the bridge (Figure 7.10) and at 
Swanns Road lateral spreading of the approach fill (Figure 
7.11), incipient lateral spreading at the abutments (Figures 
7.12 and 7.13), and cracking of the abutment and retaining 
walls (Figure 7.14 and 7.15) was observed. However, both 
bridges remained serviceable. At the footbridge crossing over  
the river approximately midway between the Swanns Road 
and Gayhurst Road bridges, just south of where Medway Road 
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joins River Road on the west bank of the Avon River 
(43.531˚S, 172.6656˚E), the rather light deck of the bridge 
buckled to accommodate the lateral spreading at the abutments 
(Figure 7.16). 
7.2.3 Kaiapoi Bridges (Williams Street, Pedestrian 
Bridges) 
Behaviour similar to that observed along the Avon River in 
Christchurch was also observed at Kaiapoi River crossings.  
Incipient lateral spreading, cracking in the approach roadway, 
and cracking in the abutment walls was observed at the 
Williams Street Bridge (43.3825˚S, 172.6575˚E) (Figures 
7.17, 7.18) and buckling of the lightweight deck of a 
pedestrian bridge due to convergence of abutments as a result 
of lateral spreading was observed just north of Williams 
Street, in the vicinity of Trousselot Park (43.3811˚S, 
172.6558˚E) (Figure 7.19).  Evidence of liquefaction and 
incipient lateral spreading was also observed along the 
walking path from the Williams Street Bridge to Trousselot 
Park and in the park itself (Figure 7.20).    
  
Figure 7.1: Repaired east approach to the Bridge Street Bridge. 
  
Figure 7.2: Cracking on margins of west approach embankment, Bridge Street Bridge. 
  
Figure 7.3: Lateral spreading of east banks adjacent to the Bridge Street Bridge. 
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7.2.4 Waimakariri River Bridges (Chaneys Overpass, 
Highway 1 River Crossings) 
Cracking and incipient lateral spreading was observed at the 
northern transition between the approach embankment and the 
abutment at Chaneys overpass (Figure 7.21), where State 
Highway 1 crosses over the Christchurch Northern Motorway 
(43.4300˚S, 172.6464˚E).  The bridge is a three span bridge of 
about 80 m with what appeared to be seat-type abutments 
retrofit with cable restrainers (Figure 7.22).  However, outside 
of a few ruptured precast concrete tiles that covered the end 
embankment for the north abutment (Figure 7.23), there was 
no apparent damage to the bridge structure or its foundation, 
despite ample evidence of liquefaction beneath the bridge 
(Figure 7.24). The overpass is located in a low lying area that 
appears to be the flood plain of the Waimakariri River that 
was subject to extensive liquefaction (Figure 7.25).  Cracking 
was observed in and adjacent to the roadway in the vicinity of 
the overpass (Figure 7.26) and road crews were busy 
regrading and paving the approach to the roadway that passed 
under the overpass (Figure 7.27). This work was undertaken to 
repair the liquefaction damage to the on-ramp to the 
motorway. 
The NZ-GEER reconnaissance team also inspected the two 
main spans for the Highway 1 crossing of the Waimakariri 
River (43.4153˚S, 172.6467˚E) (Figure 7.28) and the adjacent 
railroad bridge (43.4128˚S, 172.6508˚E).  While there was 
some evidence of liquefaction adjacent to several of the piers 
for the east span of the Highway 1 crossing (Figure 7.29), 
there was no indication of displacement of the foundation 
piers or structural damage to the bridge. 
7.2.5 Kainga Road Bridge to Brooklands Residential 
Community  
The Kainga Road Bridge is a short span bridge leading to the 
Brooklands residential community (Figure 7.30), and 
according to the New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge 
Research Group, the bridge remained closed at the time of the 
Team‟s visit on 13 September 2010 at the request of local 
authorities to limit access to an adjacent area extensively 
damaged by liquefaction. Structurally, the 1963 mixed girder-
slab reinforced concrete bridge was in good condition.  
However, movement of the northeast abutment wing wall 
resulted in damage to an 180 mm diameter sewage pipe that 
was rigidly connected along the bridge span (Figure 7.31). 
Raw sewage continued to flow into the river from the 
damaged pipe at the time of the site visit (Figure 7.32a). 
Posted signs and discussions with locals confirmed that the 
flow was contaminated liquid (Figure 7.32b). Directly below 
the bridge, a pipe of similar diameter suffered no damage, and 
the team noted that its support to the abutment wall was filled 
with flexible foam (Figure 7.33). At the East abutment, the 
northern wing wall moved towards the river and developed a 
gap with its backfill soils of about 2 cm, whereas the southern 
wing wall appeared to remain fixed. Soil spread away from the 
east abutment south wing wall leaving a gap of about 40 –60 
mm at its toe. Surrounding low lying marshlands and old 
paddock fields (as indicated by a postal worker interviewed 
during our visit) showed evidence of liquefaction (Figure 
7.34). 
The fills at the east and west approaches to the bridge 
appeared to have settled, but were repaired prior to the Teams 
visit. This road is one of the three access routes into the 
communities of Brooklands and Spencerville, the other being 
Lower Styx Road and Spencerville Rd. Extensive liquefaction 
was observed in Brooklands, including uplifting of sewer 
manholes along approximately 2 km of Lower Styx Road. 
 
 
(a) West abutment gap closure and spalling. 
 
 
(b) East abutment gap closure. 
Figure 7.4: Bridge Street Bridge expansion gap closure. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5; West abutment bearing pad displacement, 
Bridge Street Bridge (scale in Inches). 
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Figure 7.6: West abutment batter (angled) pile, Bridge Street 
Bridge. 
Figure 7.7: Lateral spreading on west bank, Bridge Street 
Bridge. 
  
Figure 7.8: Gap between west abutment backwall and end 
embankment, Bridge Street Bridge. 
Figure 7.9: Back rotation of west abutment, Bridge Street 
Bridge. 
  
Figure 7.10: Cracking of roadway on west approach fill, 
Swanns Road Bridge. 
Figure 7.11: Lateral spreading on west approach fill, Swanns 
Road Bridge. 
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Figure 7.12: Incipient lateral spreading at west abutment, 
Swanns Road Bridge. 
Figure 7.13: Incipient lateral spreading at north abutment, 
Gayhurst Road Bridge. 
  
Figure 7.14: Cracking of north abutment, Swanns Road 
Bridge. 
Figure 7.15: Cracking of retaining wall, north bank of the 
Avon River. 
  
(a) Buckled span. (b) Sheared bearing on east bank. 
Figure 7.16: Footbridge on the Avon River near Medway Road. 
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Figure 7.17: Cracking of east approach roadway, Williams 
Road Bridge. 
Figure 7.18: Incipient lateral spreading of east abutment, 
Williams Road Bridge. 
 
 
  
Figure 7.19: Buckling of footbridge near Trousselot Park. 
 
 
  
Figure 7.20: Cracking of sidewalk and evience of liquefaction 
in Trousselot Park. 
Figure 7.21: Incipient lateral spreading at Chaneys Overpass 
north abutment. 
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Figure 7.22: Cable Restrainers at north abutment, Chaneys 
Overpass. 
Figure 7.23: Displaced concrete tiles on end embankment for 
north abutment, Chaneys Overpass. 
 
 
Figure 7.24: Evidence of liquefaction beneath Chaneys Overpass. 
 
  
Figure 7.25: Evidence of liquefaction adjacent to Chaneys Overpass. 
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Figure 7.26: Cracking in and along roadway adjacent to Chaneys Overpass. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.27: Road being repaved adjacent on south approach to Chaneys Overpass. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7.28: Highway bridge across the Waimakariri River. 
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Figure 7.29: Evidence of liquefaction at Highway 1 bridge piers on the north side of the Waimakariri River. 
 
 
  
Figure 7.30: Kainga Road Bridge to the Brooklands residential community (a) GoogleEarth image (43.3998˚S, 172.6910˚E) and 
(b) overview of bridge looking west (43.3997˚S, 172.6916˚E). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.31: Damage to sewage pipe at the Kainga Road Bridge (43.3997°S, 172.6916°E). 
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7.3 Highways 
Most highways and major surface transportation routes 
remained open following the earthquake, or were only closed 
temporarily for inspection or minor repairs. Due to a rock fall 
along Highway 1 between Waipara and Kaikoura, the route 
remained closed 10 days following the earthquake, but it is not 
clear if the earthquake was a contributing factor since locals 
reported the section of roadway had had ongoing problems 
and there was heavy rainfall in the area prior to the 
earthquake. An alternative route along Highway 7 to Kaikoura 
was available. The Highway 74 tunnel from Christchurch to 
Lyttelton was briefly closed due to a rock fall, and Evans Pass 
Road was closed in the days following the earthquake due to a 
rock fall and remained closed after 10 days. While the closure 
of Evans Pass Road had only minor effect on mobility 
  
Figure 7.32: Outflow from damaged pipe at Kainga Road Bridge and surrounding warnings to the community (43.3997°S, 
172.6916°E). 
  
Figure 7.33: Below the East end of the Kainga road bridge 
(looking northeast). (43.3998°S, 172.6914°E). 
Figure 7.34: Evidence of liquefaction in surrounding low lying 
marshlands on the east side of the Kainga road 
bridge (43.3995°S, 172.6917°E). 
  
Figure 7.35: Railway Embankment at Rolleston (photo by I. 
McGregor). 
Figure 7.36: Damage to rail line at Woodford Glen (photo by 
L.Matthews and J. Overend). 
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between the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch and the rest of the 
South Island, it is one of the primary alternative routes 
between the Port and Christchurch should the tunnel be 
closed. The tunnel closure, however, only lasted a few hours. 
In the communities affected by liquefaction, a few roads 
remained closed 10 days following the earthquake, but 
alternative access routes were available in all areas. 
7.4 Rail System 
The Canterbury region has a rail system used primarily to 
carrying coal to the Port for export as well as for tourism 
trains. Railroad bridges are primarily of steel construction.  
The New Zealand Natural Hazard Platform Bridge Research 
Group reported damage to one railroad bridge from the 
earthquake. Rail service was also impacted from bent rails at 
the fault trace and as a result of slumping ground in some 
locations.   
Damage to railways embankments was reported by members 
of the New Zealand reconnaissance team near Rolleston 
(Figure 7.35) and Woodward Glenn, just south of Kaiapoi 
(Figure 7.36).  In the latter case, the damage appeared due to 
liquefaction-induced lateral spreading.  By the time the team 
arrived in Rolleston (13 days after the earthquake), the 
damage to the tracks had been repaired. The Team was 
informed that the damaged rail line at Rolleston was fixed the 
day of or the day after the earthquake and that the slumping 
rail lines at Woodford Glen had been repaired 4 days after the 
earthquake. 
7.5 Christchurch International Airport 
The Christchurch International Airport was closed temporarily 
for inspection and minor clean up, but was re-opened with full 
service within 9 hours of the earthquake. The airports‟ 
corporate offices were closed and temporarily relocated. 
7.6 Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 
Lyttelton Port of Christchurch (LPC) is the main port for the 
Canterbury region and of critical importance to the economy 
of the South Island. It handles coal, automobiles and fuel 
products, and about 250,000 TEU of containerized cargo 
annually. The terminals at the port are of a variety of ages, 
ranging the 1880s to current.  
The intensity of the Darfield Earthquake in the port area was 
essentially the operating basis earthquake for the port, having 
a PGA of 0.33g (as measured by a strong motion station 
within the Port). Port facilities are undergoing strengthening as 
part of the program to increase lifeline resilience in the region.  
While some Port facilities sustained significant damage, most 
Port facilities were operational within hours after the 
earthquake and no scheduled shipments were missed. By 0700 
on 4 September 2010, the two main piers and a portion of the 
coal terminal were operational. The container terminal was 
opened by 1500 on 5 September 2010. The coal terminal was 
fully operational on 8 September 2010, and the liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) terminal was opened on 10 September 
2010. Port officials were quite satisfied with the performance, 
but acknowledge that there will be significant repairs and 
rebuilding in the coming months. 
LPC has three container cranes, each with a 19 m rail spacing. 
While there was some lateral (seaward) movement of the deck 
for the container terminal, no damage to the cranes was noted 
and they were still performing as intended after the 
earthquake. The crane rails are closely enough spaced that 
both rails fit on the wharf deck. Having both rails on the deck 
appears to have avoided differential movement of the rails 
(despite the lateral displacement of the deck) and contributed 
to the good performance of the Port facilities. 
The soil profile at the Port typically consists of 10 m or more 
soft clay and silty sand layers underlain by rock, along with 
some un-engineered fill and boulder rip-rap. Liquefiable soils 
are limited to a few seams within the natural sediments and are 
believed to have had no impact on the performance of the port. 
All wharves are on vertical pile foundations, including 
hardwood timber piles, 600 mm diameter reinforced concrete 
piles, 600 mm square reinforced concrete piles, and steel pipe 
piles. Many are skin-friction piles that develop their vertical 
capacity within the underlying clay and sandy soil layers. No 
damage to any piles was observed, though some were noted to 
have apparently settled up to 0.3 m, becoming disengaged 
from the wharf deck. All the wharves underwent limited 
settlement and lateral deformation, though limited to 0.2 to 0.3 
m. Typical damage from settlement and lateral deformation 
are shown in Figures 7.37-7.39 . 
 
 
 
Figure 7.37: Settlement and lateral deformation at fuel 
transfer facility (43.60750˚S, 172.71332˚E). 
 
Figure 7.38: Temporary wooden support to accommodate 
settlement under fuel line.  
 
Figure 7.39: Cracking along jetty at eastern end of port.  
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The limited wharf movements did open up cracks in the 
asphalt pavement sections of the wharf deck. In order to keep 
the port operational, Port officials were considering different 
temporary repair alternatives, including grouting, sand infill, 
or crushed rock.  Port engineers also expressed concern that 
the concrete pavement in the backlands areas was bridging 
over voids that developed due to lateral displacement of 
retaining walls at the back of the wharves that accompanied 
lateral displacement of the deck. 
The underground 11kV electric power network remained in 
service following the earthquake, though the single sub-station 
at the port did sustain some minor damage. 
7.7 Oil Terminal at the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 
The Team visited the Oil Terminal side of the Lyttelton Port 
of Christchurch (Figure 7.40) on 13 September 2010, and the 
most significant damage was the area leased to the Fulton 
Hogan Bitumen plant (fultonhogan.com). The Team visited 
this plant and discussed observations with the plant manager, 
Steve Platt. He was advised by port officials that 
approximately 100 mm of lateral spreading of the wharf 
supporting the plants facilities had occurred on the eastern 
water face of the terminal.  
As a result of the lateral spreading, as well as liquefaction 
within the bitumen plant, four tanks and some supporting 
piping suffered movement and damage. The most severe 
lateral movement was that of Tank 1 (located at 43.6085°S, 
172.7149°E), which moved laterally 50 mm towards the water. 
Tank 2 (43.608768°S, 172.714651°E) settled uniformly about 
30 mm causing separation of the connecting bridge between it 
and a neighbouring tank of like geometry (Figure 7.42). This 
tank, with dimensions of 12.8 m high by 13 m diameter, 
housed used oil and was nearly filled to capacity at the time of 
the main shock, weighing an estimated 550 tons. Tanks 3 and 
4 (43.6085°S, 172.7149°E) were side-by-side and each 
experienced movement that resulted in pullout of nearly all 
perimeter anchor bolts at their base. These tanks were 12.5 m 
tall by 6 m diameter with an estimated 150 ton weight at the 
time of the main shock. Crews were repairing the support 
anchorage for Tanks 3 and 4 with the retrofit shown in Figure 
7.43. No structural damage to the tanks was observed and 
flexible connections survived the strong shaking with only 
minor leakage. Asphalt repair using cement injection to fill the 
lateral spread cracks was on-going during the teams visit 
(Figure 7.44). Sand boils were also observed at several 
locations within the plants boundaries. Soil samples of the 
ejecta indicated the material was clean sand with little to no 
fines (Figure 7.45). 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7.40: Port of Lyttelton locating the oil terminal area (GoogleEarth image; 43.6088°S, 172.7140°E) and (b) Aerial view of 
the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant (image taken from 43.6068°S, 172.7272°E). 
 
  
Figure 7.41: Zoomed into the region of the Fulton Hogan 
Bitumen Plant. (GoogleEarth image; 43.6088°S, 
172.7140°E). 
Figure 7.42 Tank 2 (right, large white tank) with Tanks 3 and 4 
shown to the left (smaller grey tanks) at the 
Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant. (43.6088°S, 
172.7147°E). 
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A seismic station was also identified within the plants 
boundaries housed within the plant main entry building 
(43.6086°S, 172.7136°E), but was not operational for the main 
shock. Workers attempted to power it following the main 
shock and Mr. Platt believes it was on during the 5.1 
aftershock centred below the Port Hills. 
7.8 Water and Wastewater Systems 
By far the greatest impact on the community was the 
performance of water and wastewater systems in the 
Canterbury region. The Christchurch, Selwyn, and 
Waimakariri Districts all experienced damage to the pipe 
networks in areas affected by liquefaction, resulting in loss of 
service and discharge of untreated wastewater into the 
groundwater and surface water. 
In all three districts, drinking water is untreated well water. 
Water mains are predominately asbestos-cement pipe, with 
newer pipes being HDPE. All wastewater pipes are concrete 
bell-and-spigot. Damage to both systems was concentrated in 
the areas affected by liquefaction. 
7.8.1 Christchurch City Council 
A precautionary water boil advisory was put in place 
immediately after the earthquake by the Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) and was lifted on 9 September 2010, with only 
two minor problems being reported. CCC officials estimate 
that 6 to 7 km of water mains will need to be replaced, and the 
replacement of similar lengths of wastewater pipes are 
expected. Officials observed that crews performed the 
equivalent of “a year‟s worth of maintenance in 6 days.”  
Damage to the CCC‟s system was predominately to the water 
and wastewater mains, as a result of ground movement and 
floating of manholes. A major problem with sewer lines was 
influx of liquefied sand and water through breaks in the line.  
Cleaning sand out of sewer pipes and pump stations was a 
major factor affecting restoration of service.  Repair crews 
found pipes that were simply pulled apart, while others were 
crushed at the joints. No problems were associated with pipes 
crossing bridges that CCC officials were aware of. CCC 
officials expressed concern about voids that may have 
developed beneath pavements due to the estimated 11,000 tons 
of sand removed from pipes and pump stations (corresponding 
to a potential void volume of approximately 9,000 m3). 
All new pump stations have flexible joints and performed 
well. At older stations, one pipe with a rigid connection was 
sheared (at Halswell) and one water pump was lost (which 
was identified as vulnerable and scheduled to be replaced).  
All pumping stations have back-up power supplies, and all 
worked as intended. The wastewater treatment plant in 
Christchurch was unaffected by the earthquake, though an 
increase of flows into the plant of up to 20% were observed as 
a result of groundwater inflow through the pipe breaks. 
CCC officials indicated that restoration of drinking water took 
a priority over wastewater, and that work had yet to start on 
the storm sewer system. Ongoing problems included 
additional pipe breaks and removal of silt and sand from pipes 
  
Figure 7.43: Typical repair to Tank 3 and 4 (addition of clamp 
plates). Note the pullout of the original 
anchorage. Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant. 
(43.6085°S, 172.7149°E). 
Figure 7.44: Repair of lateral spread cracks within the Fulton 
Hogan Bitumen Plant, nearby Tank 3. 
(43.6085°S, 172.7150°E). 
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Figure 7.45: Laser diffraction tests of samples taken from ejecta observed at the Fulton Hogan Bitumen Plant. Sample WP169 
taken at 43.6087°S, 172.7142°E. 
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and pumping stations. The CCC asset management plan calls 
for pipe replacement if three breaks are observed in any 
pipeline over the period of one year. They are now doing a 
cost analysis of clearing pipelines by jetting, Closed-Circuit 
TV (CCTV) inspection, and repair of existing pipelines versus 
abandonment and replacement. As part of the efforts to 
improve resilience, CCC spends about 1% of their 
maintenance budget on resilience upgrades. 
7.8.2 Selwyn District Council 
Most of the water and wastewater networks in the Selwyn 
District council (SDC) performed quite well. Very few breaks 
were reported, mostly in foothill areas. A blanket water boil 
advisory was lifted 5 days after the earthquake.  The biggest 
reported problem was the new (less than 3 years old) 
wastewater treatment plant had to be taken offline, eliminating 
1500 m3/day of capacity. Flows were fortunately redirected to 
the old plant that had been recently replaced, but had not yet 
been completely taken out of service. The new plant was 
running again in 9 days, near 100% after 10 days. 
Loss of power to pumping facilities was the most common 
form of outage. Under established protocols, the power 
network shuts down automatically after a major earthquake, 
whether there is damage or not, and service is not restored 
until inspections indicate it can be restored safely.  Most of the 
large facilities had stand-by power generators and some 
mobile generators were available and used. However, SDC 
engineers expressed the need for additional mobile units. The 
mobile generators that were available were rotated in order to 
provide residents with at least intermittent services. One 
complicating factor was the rise in the water level of several 
drinking water wells. According to SDC engineers, the water 
level in one well rose by 5.3 m, another by 3 m, and two went 
artesian and water was pouring out of the electrical 
connections in the well head. 
7.8.3 Waimakariri District Council 
While the types of problems were similar, the Waimakariri 
District Council (WDC) was much harder hit than 
Christchurch, primarily due to the extensive liquefaction and 
the associated lateral spreading in Kaiapoi. A precautionary 
water boil advisory was still in effect 10 days after the 
earthquake. It was to be lifted on 12 September 2010, but a 
single sample tested positive for E-Coli and the advisory was 
extended. 
WDC officials estimate that the system was providing water to 
70% of residents within one day of the earthquake, 85% after 
the second day, and nearly 100% by the ninth day (noting that 
the water was intentionally not restored to several damaged 
structures). This restoration was to the private property lines, 
beyond which service is the responsibility of individual 
property owners. However, WDC crews were also working 
with residents to provide service all the way to their homes. In 
hindsight when considering repairs, WDC officials wondered 
if they could have restored the water service sooner by using 
more temporary above-ground flexible piping, as was done on 
the final days of restoration. Ten days after the earthquake (on 
13 September 2010), 60% of Kaiapoi‟s wastewater was being 
collected and treated at the wastewater treatment plant.  
However, 40% of sewage system flows were still being 
discharged into the river untreated.  City engineers estimated 
that the amount of untreated wastewater would be reduced to 
5% by September 17. 
WDC officials felt the biggest problems were the deep gravity 
wastewater mains.  In many cases these mains were 3 to 4 
meters below ground surface with ground water only 2 m 
deep. In addition, some of the mains are located in the 
backyards of private residences, making access and 
subsequent repairs more difficult.  
7.8.4 Residential Communities of Spencerville and 
Brooklands 
In a number of residential communities, sewage and potable 
water were problematic immediately following the main 
shock. Perhaps hardest hit were the communities of 
Spencerville and Brooklands. At the time of the Teams visit 
on 13 September 2010, neither community had a functioning 
wastewater collection system, and Brooklands did not have 
potable water. Liquefaction along Lower Styx Rd, the primary 
connection between these two communities, caused ground 
subsidence, a rise in the water table, and uplifting of 25 
manholes (Figure 7.46). Construction workers were 
dewatering the region during the Team‟s visit and informed us 
that the manholes were 4 m deep. The manholes were 
approximately 280-460 mm above the existing road surface 
(Figure 7.47).  
 
 
Figure 7.46: Approximately 2 km stretch along Lower Styx 
Road with observed uplifted manholes. 
(GoogleEarth image; 43.4059°S, 
172.6999°E). Waypoints 136-160 represent 
locations of elevated manholes. 
 
 
Figure 7.47: Uplifted manholes along Lower Styx Road, 
note the continuation of pattern in the 
foreground (43.4113°S, 172.6930°E). 
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7.9 Electric Power 
The electric power system performed quite well following the 
earthquake, with much of the good performance attributed to 
the hardening of the system over the last decade. No problems 
were noted with the generation or transmission system, and 
problems with the distribution systems were primarily 
associated with liquefaction.  
Orion, the primary service provider in Christchurch, reported 
restoring power to 90% of customers within one day of the 
earthquake, with much of the remaining 10% not being 
restored as a precautionary measure. Each substation was 
individually inspected prior to restoring power, and many of 
the older switches were manually reset after being tripped 
during the earthquake. Both 66 kV and 11kV lines are part of 
the system, with most of the lines located underground. The 
Christchurch network is old and, having many alternate routes, 
Orion was able to re-route power to provide service even 
though line breaks still existed. Of the 20 high voltage cable 
faults detected, 11still needed to be repaired 10 days after the 
earthquake. Only two substations in Christchurch went offline 
during the earthquake, both from settlement as a result of 
liquefaction. The last back-up generator was taken off-line on 
8 September 2010. 
7.10 Waste Management & Landfill 
The Kate Valley Landfill, operated by Canterbury Waste 
Services, is the regional waste disposal facility for the affected 
area.  However, the Christchurch City Council opened up a 
cell at the closed Burwood Landfill facility to accommodate 
the increased volume of waste generated by earthquake 
response and recovery efforts.  Furthermore, limits on the 
volume of incoming waste were temporarily waved at Kate 
Valley and the facility increased working hours to 
accommodate the increased volume of waste after the 
earthquake.   
Canterbury Waste Services (CWS) resumed operation and 
household collection of waste two days after the earthquake. 
CWS uses collection centres throughout region and transfers 
the waste to Kate Valley Landfill approximately 65 kilometres 
north of the city.  On Sunday, the day after the earthquake 
CWS began hauling waste collected before the earthquake 
from their collection centres to clear them in anticipation of 
increased waste tonnage.  For a two week period following the 
event, the tonnage delivered to the landfill approximately 
doubled from 800-900 tons/day to 1700-1800 tons/day. 
Demolition debris collected in Christchurch was taken to 
recycling centres, with residual waste taken to the reopened 
cell at the Burwood landfill. 
The CCC and CWS recycle approximately 70% of the total 
organic waste generated in the region, which means that most 
of the waste entering the regional landfill has a low water 
content and does not decompose.  One of CWS‟s concerns 
was the increased amounts of high water content waste from 
grocery stores and grocery distribution centres entering the 
landfill after the earthquake and creating a potentially unstable 
waste body.  CWS received permission to temporarily spread 
high-liquid waste loads on the ground at a local quarry to 
allow liquids to drain prior to disposal in the landfill.  CWS 
also mixed incoming high water content wastes with MSW at 
the collection centres, thus reducing the water content prior to 
arrival of the waste at the landfill.    
The Team visited the Kate Valley landfill and found that it 
performed as designed.  The landfill is located approximately 
85 kilometres from the epicentre. The landfill is a valley fill 
with 2.5:1 slide slopes.  The lining configuration consists of an 
encapsulated membrane back geosynthetic clay 
line/geomembrane system composed of a 0.4 mm high density 
polyethylene (HDPE) geomembrane with 6 mm of dry 
bentonite adhered to it, overlain by a 1 mm HDPE liner. No 
slipping of the waste body or damage to the lining system was 
reported by the operator.  No other lined structures such as 
dairy milking barn wastewater ponds or lined reservoirs had 
reported damage. 
7.11 Other Lifelines 
Other lifelines such as landline and cellular and telephones, 
fuel supply, television and radio performed well in the 
earthquake. While some land telephone lines were out of 
service, no interruption of cellular telephone service was 
observed. Service providers were aware of the potential for 
tower battery drawdown in an emergency, as was observed in 
the 2010 Chile Earthquake, but had installed generators at key 
locations and have agreements with local residents to keep 
them fuelled. 
No interruption in fuel from Lyttelton Port of Christchurch 
was observed. Television broadcasting facility was 
undamaged and had four days of fuel in preparation for 
emergency power outages. The local bus service was restored 
on 7 September 2010. 
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